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Lustration laws, which discharge the influence of old power structures 
upon entering democracies, are considered the most controversial measure 
of transitional justice. This article suggests that initial examinations of 
lustrations have often overlooked the tremendous challenges faced by new 
democracies. It identifies the motives behind the approval of two distinctive 
lustration laws in the Czech Republic and Poland, examines their capacity 
to meet their objectives, and determines the factors that influence their perfor- 
mance. The comparison of the Czech semi-renibutive model with the Polish 
semi-reconciliatory model suggests the relative success of the fonner within 
a few years following its approval. It concludes that a certain lustration model 
might be significant for democratic consolidation in other transitional coun- 
tries. 
The Czech word lustrace and the Polish lustrucju have enlivened the 
forgotten English term lustration,’ which is derived from the Latin term lus- 
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1. Lustration has become a common term in Central and Eastern Europe and a scholarly 
terminology elsewhere. For example, a search for lustracja brought about 2,790 results, lustrace 
2,190 results, and lwtration 4,010 results using the Google search engine (http://www. 
google.com, 3 December 2001). Law d Social Inquiry devoted a special volume to the subject 
(1995). 
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tro. Lustro means “to review, survey, observe, examine” (Lewis and Short 
1879).* In pre- 1989 Czechoslovakia, its application usually referred to the 
examination, conducted by the police for their own purposes, to determine 
whether a person was registered in the secret police  record^.^ After 1989, 
lustrution has come to mean the examination of certain groups of people, 
especially politicians, public officials, and judges, to determine whether they 
had been members or collaborators of the secret p ~ l i c e , ~  or held any other 
positions in the repressive apparatus of the totalitarian regime. 
Lustrution law is a special public employment law that regulates the 
process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public posi- 
tions worked or collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the communist 
regime. The law defines who can/must be subjected to the examination, 
who is in charge of the examination, how the lustration procedure works, 
and the consequences of an eventual positive lustration. A finding of posi- 
tive lustration means the examination uncovers evidence that a person 
worked for the repressive apparatus of the previous regime. 
A remarkable number of studies and reports have been published since 
the first lustration law was enacted in Czechoslovakia in 1991,5 followed by 
Lithuania in the same year, Bulgaria in 1992, Hungary in 1994, Albania in 
1995, and Poland in 1997 (Kritz 1995; Constitution Watch 1992-2000). 
Most of them evaluate the lustration laws from the perspective of human 
rights standards and reach very critical conclusions. For example, the Czech 
lustration law was criticized by the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
(Report of the Committee 1992), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun- 
cil of Europe (Resolution 1096, 1996), and human rights organizations (e.g., 
Memorandum on the Applicability of International Agreements to the 
2. The term has also another relevant meaning-to punh by means ofa propitiatory offer- 
ing or purification by sncrifice. When introducing lustration, some authors emphasize this mean- 
ing, suggesting, e.g., “the purification of state organizations from their ‘sins’ under the 
communist regimes” (Boed 1999,358). Some authors recognize the coincidence of both mean- 
ings (Cepl 1992, 24-26). 
3.  The police term lustration referred to the process of inquiry directed to the statistic- 
evidence department to determine whether any data existed about a particular person. Such 
inquiries were initiated by an operative or a leading member of the Corps of the National 
Security (Zacek 2000,41). The data were gathered on individuals or groups considered inimi- 
cal to the socialist order by members or collaborators with the secret police. The files on 
collaborators usually included their real as well as cover names, and a description of the way 
the collaboration was launched, the information gathered, the assessment of their reliability 
(which could lead to their promotion), and the reward they received. The information was 
stored in files, microfiches and later in computer databases, and listed in a register of files. 
Although in Czechoslovakia (and similarly in Poland) many files were destroyed, the register 
of files remained untouched (Zacek 2000, 41-42). 
4. In socialist Czechoslovakia, the name of the secret police was Statni bezpecnost (State 
Security), or StB. In Poland, its name was Sluzba bezppieczenstwa (Security Service), or SB. 
Other secret services existed in both countries (see part 2 of this article). 
5. In 1990, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was renamed the Czech and Slovak 
Federative Republic (CSFR). Since 1993, it split into two independent states, the Czech 
Republic (CR) and the Slovak Republic (SR). 
Lustration Laws in Action 389 
Screening Law 1992). Nevertheless, these reviews were often abstract and 
their authors did not pay adequate attention to the motives of lustration 
laws, which stemmed from the complicated political and societal situation 
in transitional countries. Recent research on the transition of totalitarian 
power structures (Los and Zybertowicz 1999, 2000; Tucker 1999) indicates 
that many of the criticisms against lustrations might be unwarranted, and 
many critics underestimated or overlooked its legitimate aims, which can 
justify a proportional encroachment of certain rights allowed by interna- 
tional conventions.6 
This paper evaluates the lustration laws from the perspective of their 
aims. It consists of three major parts. The first part determines the motiva- 
tion for enacting lustration laws in Central and East European countries. 
The identified lustration aims provide a normative framework for the evalua- 
tion of lustration laws and policies. The second part examines the lustration 
laws, their scopes and procedures. The third part assesses how the identified 
aims were incorporated into the laws and evaluates their impact. The final 
part summarizes the lessons other emerging democracies can learn from the 
experiences of Central Europe. 
This paper is based on analysis of the following documents: the laws in 
question, their constitutional reviews and related legal norms; parliamentary 
debates, reports, and political statements; country reports, newspapers, and 
magazines; and previously conducted opinion polls. Together they illustrate 
the complexity of the problem, its eventual urgency, and the sociopolitical 
contexts within which lustration laws were embedded. A systematic empiri- 
cal study of the working of lustration laws would be very difficult because 
of the sensitivity and secrecy surrounding these processes. The presented 
review of information, from various sources, points to certain plausible 
mechanisms, tendencies, problems, and opinions without any claim to their 
systematic, empirical ~erification.~ 
This article compares lustration policies in the Czech Republic and 
Poland because a comparative perspective enables us to better evaluate them 
and determine the lustration law that has better fulfilled its expectations. 
The Czech Republic and Poland are chosen because both countries deal 
with the similar legacy of the communist regimes, but are influenced by 
6. For example, art. 10 (2) of the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221) allows a propor- 
tional limitation of the freedom of expression. Cf. arts. 8, 9, and 11. The European Court of 
Human Rights usually determines whether an interference was prescribed by law, pursued 
one or more defined legitimate aims, and was necessary in a democratic society to attain 
them. See also supra note 16. Cf. supra note 90. 
7. The author thanks one of the reviewers for this comment. In the following text, several 
abbreviations, which originate in Czech and Polish languages, are used to describe these re- 
sources: CTK-Czech Press Agency, PAP-Polish Press Agency; CBOS-( Polish) Center 
for Public Opinion Research; IVVM-( Czech) Institute for PubJic Opinion Research; Dz.u.- 
(Polish) gazette of laws; Sb.-(Czech) collection of laws; P1. US-Judgment of the Plenum 
of the Czech/Czechoslovak Constitutional Court. 
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quite contrary political circumstances in their transition to democracy. As 
a result, they have developed distinctive models of lustration laws. 
Poland was the first country in the region to overthrow communism, 
but the last to approve a lustration law.’ The Polish transition was negotiated 
through round table talks in February, March, and April 1989. At that time, 
still-confident communists conceded only semi-democratic elections, mak- 
ing 35% of the seats in the Sejm (the Lower Chamber; the power of the 
then-established Senate was marginal) available. Although Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki was appointed the first noncommunist prime minister after the 
sweeping “victory” of Solidarity in the election held in June 1989, General 
Czeslaw Kiszczak remained the minister of the interior until July 1990, and 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski occupied the Polish presidency until December 
1990. The cleavages among noncommunist political parties elected in 1991 
did not provide majority conditions for the approval of the lustration law. 
In fact, the lustration debate in 1992 led to the fall of the government of 
Jan Olszewski. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which was dominated 
by former communists, won the 1993 elections and was against lustra ti on^.^ 
The Polish lustration law was passed after the victory of the center-right 
parties in 1997. However, it was not implemented until 1999.’’ 
Czechoslovakia was one of the last countries in the region to overthrow 
communism, but the first one to enact a lustration law. Faced with unexpect- 
edly massive demonstrations and the collapse of communism in neighboring 
countries, the Communist Party gave up its power in November 1989. The 
Velvet Revolution led to the establishment of the government of the na- 
tional understanding. Members of this political coalition were mostly nomi- 
nated by the then-formed opposition political movement, Civic Forum 
(OF), although a few of them, including Prime Minister Marian Calfa, were 
initially communists. The center-right factions of the Forum, which gradu- 
ally established political parties, were able to gather majority support for 
the lustration bill. These parties have maintained their control over the 
Parliament since then.” These conditions explain why, in contrast with 
~~ 
8. The following discussion does not aim to provide readers with a detailed account of 
the transition processes, which are discussed in other materials (e.g., Pehe 1991; Kritz 1995, 
2533-68; Los 1995; Misztal 1999; Kauba 2002; Constitution Watch 1992-2002). 
9. The left coalition approved an anti-lustration public employment law (act from 5 July 
1996 on Civil Service, Dz.U.96.89.402). Art. 28 (1) 1 required seven years of relevant working 
experience for senior public posts, making them available solely for old communist cadres. 
10. The coalition dominated by the former communist SLD won the 2001 elections in 
Poland. This led to the 2002 amendment of the lustration law, which narrowed its scope and 
modified its procedure. After the Constitutional Tribunal abrogated this amendment, the 
coalition pushed through the Parliament another amendment in September of the same year, 
which is also expected to be challenged at the Tribunal (see note 5 5 ) .  This article only 
evaluates the lustration policies in both countries to the end of 2001. 
11. In the 1996 elections, the center-right parties initially won merely 99 of 200 seats 
but they were “tolerated” by the social democrats and soon “gained” one of its deputies. They 
had majority in the Parliament even during the minority government of the social democracy 
(1998-2002). 
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Poland, Czechoslovakia was able to approve a lustration law shortly after 
the breakdown of communism. 
The lengthy, unregulated, wild lustration stage in Poland ( 1989-99) 
had a significant impact on the character of the law and the needs that it 
attempted to meet. On the one hand, the period offered Poland time to 
learn from the experiences of other countries and from international criti- 
cisms against them. On the other hand, the time gap may have given the 
power networks, which the law was supposed to neutralize, an opportunity 
to influence the preparation of the bill. As a result of these contrary tenden- 
cies, the Polish lustration law has a complex procedure, narrow scope, and 
minimal sanctions. This contrasts with the broader and more simplistic 
Czech lustration law, which is based on the disqualification of former politi- 
cal elite and security networks from leading public posts. 
This brief summary highlights how the power distribution at the time 
of regime changes (Zalaquett 1992), the political ideology of the ruling ma- 
jority (Los 1995, 156-61), and the situation in neighboring countries (Pion- 
Berlin 1994, 123)12 influenced the policy of dealing with the past. 
I. THE AIMS OF LUSTRATIONS 
The evaluation of the lustration policies is pursued via the outcome 
model that determines the extent to which the policies have achieved their 
formal as well as informal ends.13 This model presupposes the identification 
of the aims as criteria for the evaluation and requires an analysis of the 
relationships between aims, which may overlap, condition, or contradict 
one another. It also considers changes in the intensity of these aims over 
time, the processes of their achievement, and various external factors that 
determine the outcomes. In addition to the formal aims that are articulated 
in legal and political materials, such as preambles to the laws, parliamentary 
debates, political resolutions, and other official statements, which express 
the views of political majority, the model takes into account unofficial goals, 
which may be highlighted by the critics of the process.14 
12. Based on the comparison of transition in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, Pion-Berlin 
(1994, 126) concludes that this “contagion effect” has a weak to moderate influence. 
13. This model expands the classic evaluation goal model (Rutman 1977) by paying 
attention to the unofficial aims and to dynamic relationships among aims (Chen 1990, 167- 
90). A notable attempt to adopt the classic model to evaluate Czech lustrations was pursued 
by Williams (1999). 
14. One reviewer pointed to the perils of the evaluation: “One might imagine a weak 
lustration that is shaped by powerful forces from the Communist-era regime who succeed in 
largely muzzling the inquiry into the past. Such a lustration would then ‘succeed’ wonderfully 
if it lives up to its artificially and endogenously limited goals.” I do not share this view. The 
aims, which are derived from the arguments of a political minority and, in this case, are 
congruent with other research, sufficiently complement official/endogenous goals. Generating 
these aims from the opinions of individual deputies among both supporters and opponents 
also minimizes the chance of limiting the aims to those desired by powerful communist-era 
forces. Although the reviewer does not suggest any alternative framework, a model that is 
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TABLE 1 
Lustration Motives Raised in Parliamentary Debates 
Czechoslovakia* Poland** 
(% of the 72 deputies 
who approved the motives 
(Yo of 100 pro-lustra- 
tion arguments that 
Aim of Lustrations in their speech) included the motives) 
Personnel discontinuity and 50 
minimal justice 
safety 
lation by law 
National security and public 21 
Protection of rights and regu- 14 
Truth revelation 14 
Protection of territorial inte- 3 
Trust 3 
grity 
16 
52 
not available 
20 
not available 
not available 
SOURCES: * Federal Assembly of CSFR 1991, 17th sess.; ** Los 1995, 144, 146, and 148. 
Analyzing the lustration debate in the Polish Senate, Maria Los (1995, 
143-54) identified three affirmative lustration discourses that reflected the 
three main pro-lustration themes: historical truth, minimal justice, and state 
~ecurity.’~ The analysis of the lustration debate in the Czechoslovak Federal 
Assembly (17th sess. 1991) has confirmed the relevance of these goals. It 
also identified another three aims: “the protection of rights and the need 
to regulate the process by law,” “territorial integrity,’’ and “trust.”16 Table 1 
summarizes the frequencies of these arguments in the Czech and Polish lus- 
tration debates. 
Historical experience may explain the different priorities of Czechoslo- 
vak and Polish parliamentarians. After the breakdown of communism in 
Czechoslovakia, personnel changes were demanded partly in response to the 
massive purges conducted by the regime after 1948 and 1968. These changes 
symbolized the element of minimal justice (see note 15 and part 1A). In 
independent of the endogenous political process would face the risk that it tests the law 
against aims that are irrelevant. A pure theory-based framework could perpetuate shared pre- 
sumptions, which have been, in the case of lustration, rather distorted. 
15.  Historical truth concerns the “need to reconstruct what really happened, the preven- 
tion of a ‘fabrication of history,’ and the moral conceptualization of responsibility” (Los 1995, 
143). According to minimal justice discourse, “[l]ustration is rarely seen as capable of achiev- 
ing full-scale ‘historical’ justice . . . it simply makes places at the top inaccessible to those 
who contributed to the former apparatus of coercion” (1995, 146). State security concerned 
the perils of not carrying lustration out. “The perils are connected with having undisclosed 
(former) collaborators in positions of authority, when their past may still hold power over 
them” (1995, 148). 
16. These aims fall within the legitimate aims as recognized by the European jurispru- 
dence (Glasenapp v. Germany 1986; Lander pi. Sweden 1987; Vogt v. Germany 1995; Ahmd 
v. United Kingdom 1998; cf. note 6). 
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contrast, the emphasis on security motives of Polish senators reflects the 
experience of the country, whose geopolitical position between Russian and 
German empires exposed her to numerous devastating invasions. Another 
concern of Polish senators was related to the increase of crime during transi- 
tion, some of which was perpetrated by former security operatives, and the 
dramatic increase of its media coverage, which created feelings of threat in 
~ociety.‘~ 
Naturally, many deputies did not sign up for any of these aims brought 
by lustration supporters. They had different personal experiences in the past, 
with competing political interests in the processes of transition, and thus, 
followed conflicting ideologies, which mobilized or served various segments 
of the electorate. They also had different perspectives on new human rights 
violations and considered the attitude of the international community to- 
ward the process differently. 
It seems that the vital political interest of advocates of the lustration 
law was to gain control over the state apparatus, whereas many of its oppo- 
nents sought to preserve the old networks and maximize their social capital. 
Some lustration supporters tried to cover their realpolitik intentions under 
the veil of morality, whereas lustration opponents considered the law im- 
moral. The central ideological battle was to gain control over the perception 
of the past: Opponents wanted to preserve a good picture of the past, conced- 
ing a few unfortunate aberrations, whereas advocates sought value disconti- 
nuity with the communist system. The dispute over human rights was 
whether the law protected or violated human rights. For example, propo- 
nents argued for the right of the previously disadvantaged to just remedy, 
whereas opponents alleged that lustration laws violated the right to associa- 
tion of former communist leaders. According to them, the law would cause 
the international isolation of the country because of its encroachment of 
human rights standards. On the other hand, advocates argued that the inter- 
national community would not isolate the new democracy because the law 
actually protected human rights. 
The analysis of the Czechoslovak lustration debate shows that human 
rights violations were the most frequently used argument against lustrations, 
followed by vengeance and political rivalry. This confirms fairly common 
reservations against the process among scholars.” 
This paper evaluates the lustration laws according to the five identified 
aims: “personnel discontinuity and minimal justice,” “national security and 
17.  “Poland’s private security sector seems to have played two decisive roles: first by 
producing and increasing risks, and then by creating a new demand for market-based means 
to govern those same risks” (Los 2001). 
18. For example, Schwartz states that “Revenge seems to be a primary goal of much of 
the lustration legislation” (quoted in Kritz 1995, 1474; cf. 464,469). Los describes a dystopian 
discourse that claims that “the whole process of lustration [is] being used against political 
opponents in ugly power struggles” (1995, 129; cf. 154-55). 
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TABLE 2 
Major Arguments Against Lustration During Czechoslovak Parliamentary 
Debate 
Deputies Making this Deputies Denying 
Anti-lustration Argument Argument (%) this Charge (%) 
Human rights violations 
Vengeance 
Political rivalry 
15 
12.5 
4 
5.5 
11 
0 
SOURCE Federal Assembly of CSFR 1991, 17th sess. 
public safety,” “the protection of rights and the need for legal regulation of 
the process,” and “truth revelation.” Moreover, it examines whether and to 
what extent the law constitutes vengeance as alleged by its opponents. This 
paper does not review the lustration laws from the perspective of human 
rights. The allegations of human rights violations are evaluated in a separate 
paper (David 2002a). 
A. Minimal Justice: Personnel Discontinuity with the Totalitarian 
Apparatus 
Although a legitimate parliament was established and a new govem- 
ment appointed after the first free elections, the state apparatus remained 
to a large extent unchanged. Ten months after the Velvet Revolution, 
Czechoslovak President Vaclav Have1 made this announcement: 
We had free elections, . . . we elected a free parliament, we have a free 
press, we have a democratic government. Yet . . . [tlhere still exist and 
work the powerful structures of the former regime. . . . Many places are 
governed by the same people as before. They are connected to managers 
of industrial enterprises. There exist immense bureaucratic colossuses 
that preclude rational economic behavior of individual enterprises and 
firms. The old bureaucracy persists at all levels. (1990b) 
According to a poll conducted in 1991, 50% of Czechoslovak respon- 
dents considered the lustration act would be beneficial to personnel situa- 
tions in enterprises and state offices (IVVM 2000). 
Similarly in Poland, former communist nomenklat~ra’~ remained in con- 
19. According to Los, nomeklatura is “a secret list of these important positions at all 
levels of the economic and state administrations, and all other areas of institutional life, 
which are formally reserved for loyal party members” (1988, 147). In its common use, this 
term refers to the elite stratum formed on this basis. 
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trol in both formal and informal ways. Approximately one-quarter of them 
occupied senior public posts in the mid-1990s (Wasilewski 1995, quoted in 
Los and Zybertowicz 1999, 285), while the majority of cadres capitalized on 
their positions during the privatization process (Los and Zybertowicz 2000, 
11 1-13). Another survey, conducted among Polish business, political, and 
administrative elite in 1998, one year after the electoral defeat of the post- 
communist SLD and one year before the Polish lustration law came into 
effect, confirmed that no single group could be characterized as being domi- 
nated by former anticommunist opposition and that the thesis about the 
origin of the business elite in the communist world is well founded (Wasi- 
lewski 2000, 206-7). In view of the continuing dominance of the old net- 
works, it was not surprising that in 1996,57% of Poles considered lustrations 
as necessary, while 24% opposed it (CBOS 1997). 
The inherited apparatus was perceived as an inimical element in the 
new democracy because its positions were filled on the basis of the unfair 
ideological criteria of the previous regime, such as “political maturity, a cre- 
ative Marxist-Leninist approach to the solution of problems, and the deter- 
mination to consistently bring the party’s policies to life” (Cadre Orders 
1984). Thus, one of the legislature’s post-1989 objectives was to accomplish 
a form of redress, to provide opportunities for those who were previously 
excluded from offices because of political reasons.*’ This embodied an ele- 
ment of minimal justice. It was not a full-scale or criminal justice that would 
bring all of those who were responsible for communist crimes to the court. 
Yet it did not perpetuate and legitimize past injustices because it denounced 
the selection criteria of the past. In addition, the urgent task was to remove 
nomenklatura officials and secret police officers because of their characteris- 
tics and networks. 
A totalitarian society organized as a military unit demanded submissive- 
ness and obedience. On the other hand, liberal democracy requires efficient 
management and responsibility.” Sound political and economic reforms can 
only be accomplished through the transition of peoples’ value systems. The 
largely incompetent and corrupted totalitarian bureaucracy could obstruct 
the implementation of governmental policies of societal transformation. In- 
deed, technical incompetence led to the removal of many cadres from the 
former East German public administration (Teitel 2000, 165). 
More important, lawmakers were aware of the gross human rights viola- 
tions perpetrated by the old repressive apparatus. Therefore, they assert, key 
democratic positions should not be held by “citizens previously involved 
20. According to Deputy J. Schneider (1991), it was necessary “to fulfill positive prerequi- 
sites. . . because those who are not affected by the act have a handicap from the past-they 
did not have access to the [positions].” 
21. According to Cepl and Gillis (1996, 123), “What Eastern Europe needs now is not 
disciplined, obedient apparatchiki, but innovators, entrepreneurs, stubborn, free-minded, even 
unmanageable people.” 
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in activities of the organs and organizations, which consciously suppressed 
democracy and human rights” (Kopriva 1991). The deputies wanted to pre- 
vent the abuse of power that was typical of the communist system in Czecho- 
slovakia” as well as in Poland.23 
The criminal activities of the former communist nomenklatura and the 
secret police members did not cease with the fall of communism. On the 
contrary, their networks spanning administrative and business sector were 
at the center of various illegal activities during the reform period. 
[Whenever there is an extremely rapid multiplication of capital . . . , 
we find, in the background, people from the former nomenklatura, in- 
cluding Special Services. Their connections; access to difficult-to-ob- 
tain information (for instance, in cases of tender bidding); expertise in 
acting both on the margins of law and outside of it; the ability to infil- 
trate the agencies that constitute the infrastructure for economic activ- 
ity-these are real assets. (Zybertowicz 1993, 121, quoted in Los 1995, 
151) 
Breaking the old networks was an urgent task if economic reforms 
were to be implemented in many Central and East European countries (e.g., 
Hum1 1991). The economic issues were the significant motivation for lustra- 
tion in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland “after the nomen- 
klatura took advantage of the absence of the rule of law and its preferred 
position to steal massively and moved its gains to western banks” (Tucker 
1999, 70). 
The enactment of a special public employment law was necessary be- 
cause people holding important public positions usually did not want to 
leave, and their dismissals were almost impossible under the inherited com- 
munist employment law. Unlike in Poland, where initial personnel changes 
were subjected to round table negotiations, Czechoslovak “revolutionaries” 
expected former members of the old regime to leave voluntarily. However, 
they were soon disappointed, realizing that their policy of unconditional 
forgiveness was unrealistic and that members of the former repressive appa- 
ratus did not want to depart their posts. 
22. During the communist rule, about 250 people were judicially executed because of 
political reasons and about 6-8,000 people died under unclear circumstances (e.g., shot during 
attempts to escape, shot at the state border, died probably as a consequence of torture) (Stehlik 
2000). The communist judiciary condemned at least a quarter million people for political 
reasons (Koudelka et al. 1993). 
23. Between 1945 and 1956, about 200,000 people were imprisoned for political reasons; 
26,000 people died in prisons, many of them political prisoners. At least 3,000 people were 
judicially executed for political reasons; thousands were executed extrajudicially; between 
1945 and 1948, 8,700 people were killed. Many people were shot during demonstrations, 
hundreds were injured. During martial law, between 1981 and 1983 about 200 people were 
killed (Kobos 1999). 
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It is still officially impossible to dismiss someone because of being an 
agent of StB. They know it and although in the beginning [some of 
them] left, being happy that they had got a more than gentle chance 
to disappear quietly, they have started to make obstructions. [The state] 
cannot publicize who was lustrated positively because it would other- 
wise violate a law on confidential information. . . . According to [a 
high State official], “in some cases people would be sick if they knew 
[the content of their files].” (Janyska 1991)24 
Thus, two contradictory interpretations of the ‘Velvet Revolution” co- 
existed: The new elite sought a peaceful change, and the old elite wanted 
to preserve its status. Deputy Mlynarik, a Slovak historian, aptly pointed 
out: 
It was certainly right that we implemented the principle “we are not 
like them,” that we refrained from witch-hunt, from vengeance, but 
we underestimated our rival. He interpreted the generosity and decency 
in his own term and he used his unbroken and partly kept positions to 
the destruction and destabilization of our democratic efforts. (Mlynarik 
199 1 ) 2 5  
As a result, the pressure for changes and the effort to preserve the status 
quo were combined: former nomenklatura cadres mutually switched their po- 
sitions at different levels of society. This was called “the rotation of cadres’’ 
(Kriz 1991). Therefore, for some deputies the lustration act was essentially 
a second revolution, which President Have1 mentioned on 21 August 1990 
(Kvasnicka 1991). Hence, the law reflected the congested political situation 
following the fall of communism and the concrete activities of the former 
networks in both countries. It was a response to certain defective features 
of the transition rather than to the totalitarian regime; it was a response to 
the present activities of the past networks. It reflected frustration of the new 
elite by its nai’ve belief in the improvement of human nature and in the 
methnoia of former oppressors once confining external factors of the regime 
had disappeared. 
24. Similarly, a deputy complained: “[Wle could not get rid of the head of the interna- 
tional department [of the Federal Assembly], who was proved to he a [former] member of 
[the communist1 intelligence and . . . [the speaker] Mr. Dubcek took him for international 
visits. For example, our American counterpart alerted us that it did not contribute to the 
honor of our State when such a person accompanied the speaker of the highest legislative 
assembly” (Kulan 1991a). 
25. Similar disappointment was expressed in the speeches of 10 deputies. For example, 
according to deputy Benda, “We are on the very complicated way from the totalitarian regime 
to democracy. . . . The way IS not irreversible and it is far from its accomplishment. In this 
situation we cannot afford that representatives who without any doubt participated in crimes 
of the communist party . . . will continue their conspiracy against the democratic regime. 
. . . We gave them the opportunity [to leave], there was more or less a silence about these 
things within the first year after November [1989] and the results are catastrophic and we 
can see them everywhere around us” (1991a). 
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B. The Protection of Rights and the Need for Legal Regulation of 
the Process 
While some parts of the transitional societies remained untouched, ar- 
bitrary lustrations were carried out almost without any rules in other parts. 
In Poland, “specialized lists [of secret collaborators] for different professional 
groups have been prepared in a totally uncontrolled fashion” (Los 1995, 
13 1 ). In Czechoslovakia, people working in different state bodies were lus- 
trated arbitrarily and often without their consent. For example, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Jiri Dienstbier ordered “all the [ministry] employees, from 
car drivers up to the Minister to be lustrated in September [1990]” (Janyska 
1991).26 In 1990, Petr Uhl, the then head of the Czechoslovak Press Agency, 
forced 23 positively lustrated secret police agents to leave their posts: “I 
sharpened the situation, I literally blackmailed them. Either they leave vol- 
untarily and nobody will know anything, or we will call a meeting in their 
departments and I will confront them [about their past]’’ (Necas 1990).” 
Such arbitrariness violates the principle of the rule of law that prohibits the 
discretion of power (Dicey 1959, 188) and would not be possible under the 
Czech lustration act. In order to avoid such a witch-hunt, a law would have 
to prescribe what parts of the repressive apparatus and which democratic 
positions are subjected to lustrations. It was considered necessary to autho- 
rize a body responsible for lustrations, to set the lustration procedure, and 
to ensure its judicial review in order to protect lustrated persons (statement 
of eight opposition groups 1991, quoted in Zacek 2000, 48-49). 
The law was also supposed to calm down the tempestuous political 
situation (Fisera 1991) caused by mutual denunciation of competing politi- 
cians. A number of lustration scandals were reported in each of the Central 
European countries before the law was enacted. In Slovakia, one “political 
leader, Jan Carnogursky, has accused another, Vladimir Meciar, of cooper- 
ating with the secret police, and [. . . ] Meciar has accused Carnogursky 
of the same thing” (Michnik and Have1 1993). In Czechoslovakia, the 
Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart forced a member of his government, 
Minister of Environment Bedrich Moldan, to resign since he was registered 
in the secret police records as a candidate of secret collaboration (Blazek 
1991). 
Unregulated lustrations virtually destabilized the government in Po- 
land. On 28 May 1992, Sejm passed a resolution that obliged the minister 
of the interior to reveal the names of members of Parliament and high state 
officials who collaborated with secret services during the period of 1944- 
90 (Kauba 2002). Pursuant to the resolution, the then Minister of the Inte- 
~ ~~ 
26. “Among all diplomats, it was found 50 [secret] agents, among them six ambassadors” 
27. P. Uhl later led a group of 99 deputies to challenge the lustration act at the Constitu- 
(Janyska 1991). 
tional Court (PI. US 1/92) and became one of the strongest opponents of lustrations. 
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rior Antoni Macierewicz delivered a list of 64 names of collaborators, mostly 
from the former democratic opposition, to the Sejm (Bachmann 1996). After 
several hours of heated debate, the chamber passed a vote of no confidence 
against the government of Jan Olszewski. In 1996, in another grand-scale 
scandal in Poland, President Lech Walesa accused the then Prime Minister 
Jozef Oleksy of collaboration with the Soviet KGB and the Russian intelli- 
gence, and his allegations subsequently led to Oleksy’s resignation (Misztal 
1999, 42; Kublik, Popek, and Szulc 1996). 
If Meciar, Moldan, and Oleksy had contact with the secret services, 
some questions remained unanswered. What was the nature of the contacts? 
Were they personally involved in secret activities? Were they only consid- 
ered suitable candidates to be recruited for secret collaboration? The term 
collaboration can be ambiguous. Intellectuals often mention V. Havel’s atti- 
tude on this point: “[wle are all-though naturally to differing extents- 
responsible for the operation of the totalitarian machinery. None of us is 
just its victim. We are all also its co-creators” (Have1 1990a). Although 
there might be a continuum on the scale of responsibility between victims 
and perpetrators, it does not mean that value judgments cannot be made. 
Every continuum has its extremes. This implies, for instance, that victims 
should be compensated and perpetrators punished.*’ It is certainly possible, 
although not easy, to distinguish systematic collaboration from passive non- 
resistance (Gebethner 2000).29 Since the question is essential to the process 
of transformation, it was needed to reach consensus on the legal definition 
of collaboration, guilt, and responsibility. 
The experience of the studied countries shows that addressing these 
problems can hardly be avoided. The prohibition of lustra ti on^^^ could elimi- 
nate the discretion of power, but this prohibition could also deepen unsub- 
stantiated gossip and false accusations, leaving people without a chance to 
defend themselves. As the former Polish President Lech Walesa (1997) 
stated a “human being is defenseless against defamation. . . . The defamed 
person does not have any chance to clear himself from suspicions.” Unfortu- 
nately, such denunciations gradually spread into local politics. In his open 
letter to the prime minister, one man described his experience this way: 
28. Relativization, as in “we are all guilty,” is close to the infamous statement that Jews 
were responsible for the holocaust (Ross, quoted in Los 1995, 143). 
29. For example, Czechoslovaks had difficulty judging the “gray” category of “candidates 
of secret collaboration,” which included Minister Moldan. The category was later included 
ip the lustration law but it was subsequently invalidated by the Constitutional Court (Pl. 
US 1/92; see also note 44). The definition of collaboration was also a problem in Poland, 
where it was substantially narrowed in both 2002 amendments (see notes 10 and 55). 
30. In Czechoslovakia, lustrations were repeatedly prohibited, then permitted, required 
by one state branch and refused by another (Cf. Jicin 1990; Janyska 1990). In Poland, the 
government of Waldemar Pawlak responded to the instability following the publication of 
the “Macierewicz’s blacklist” in the same way as the Czechoslovak one. After the appointment 
of Andrzej Milczanowski as minister of the interior, access to secret files was forbidden (Bach- 
mann 1996). 
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I was a cofounder of [the local branch ofl the Civil Forum and I became 
its spokesman. It was perhaps the reason why the chairperson of a coop- 
erative [where I worked] . . . and other. . . [members of the Communist 
Party] started to gossip that I was an agent and a confidant of the StB. 
I launched a suit. . . . I was asked to prove that I was not a collaborator 
of the StB. . . . [However] I cannot be lustrated because lustrations 
were prohibited by the [Federal] Government. (Jelinek 1991, 7 )  
The new political elite faced the dilemma: Not carrying lustrations out 
may solve some problems but deepen others. The continuing scandals in 
Poland indicated that the problem of collaboration would not disappear. In 
total, at least three Polish prime ministers, including Oleksy, Cimoszewicz, 
and Buzek, and two presidents, Lech Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski, 
were publicly denounced. The issue will come back, until it is resolved, said 
Vice-premier Janusz Tomaszewski (Olszewski 1996), one of those who was 
later accused of collaboration. As a German commentator pointed out, East 
Germany “chose a horror ending-lustrations, opening files. . . . Poland 
chose a horror without an end and therefore the secret police files will create 
fear for many years” (Bachmann 2000). 
C. The Protection of National Security and Public Safety 
Concerns about the protection of newly gained democracy and the irre- 
versibility of transition had domestic and international dimensions. At the 
domestic level, the danger was related to the subversive activities of the 
former power elite. On 28 November 1989, one day after the general strike, 
which was the peak of the Velvet Revolution, the head of the then Czecho- 
slovak StB, General Alojz Lorenz, issued instructions for a conspiracy in the 
new situation, titled “on the activities of counter-intelligence to solve the 
social crisis by the use of political means,” which included tasks such as 
the following: 
To target actively the misinformation of the enemy, to discredit the 
most radical representatives of these structures in the eyes of the public, 
to make deeper ideological, personal, and action cleavages among these 
groups. To gain immediately a quality agency power in the mass media 
. . . for the benefit of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. (Direc- 
tive no. CB 002040/003-89, 1989, quoted in Bacinsky 1991) 
It seems that the activities of many former secret policemen complied 
with the instructions. The old security staff remained in control of the 
Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior (Hromadko 1990, 3), and they had 
unlimited access to the secret files for a few weeks after the Velvet Revolu- 
tion (J.S. 1990, 2; Report of the Parliamentary Commission 1991). Subse- 
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quently, ignored by new government members, they destroyed some files 
(Spumy 1990,3). It was also suspected that they copied some files for their 
future use, carried out wild lustrations of democratic politicians (Zacek 2000, 
43-46), and utilized their positions at the Ministry of the Interior to influ- 
ence key security appointments. The rotation of the nomenklatura cadres 
had also its parallel in the security sphere: 
In March 1990 . . . new personnel changes were launched in Slo- 
vakia. . . . Unfortunately, in some cases [offices were staffed] with former 
StB employees. . . . A former head of the Central Control and Revision 
Commission [of the Slovak Communist Party] was appointed the chief 
of the Kosice’s [police branch]. . . . A regional deputy of the StB in 
Kosice . . . was appointed the chief of a district [police branch] in 
Michalovce by [the Slovak] Minister [of the Interior] Meciar. (Kulan 
1991b) 
Although one can only speculate about their objectives, the activities 
of former networks posed a threat to democratic transition in both countries. 
They did not confine themselves to the security sector but spanned public 
administration, public media and state enterprises. About 262 secret agents 
kept or gained positions in the Czechoslovak media (Mlynar 1992, 3). For 
instance, in 1990 “the newspaper Narodna obroda was founded, which was 
subsidized by the Slovak government. Its dominant person was Igor Cibula, 
previously an officer of the StB with a special training for misinformation, 
[later] the head of the [public] Slovak Press Agency” (Kulan 1991b). 
Thus, Stefan Bacinsky (1991), the then director of the Czechoslovak 
new security service, summarized: “networks that destabilize all the spheres 
of our public life are everywhere. On the television, on the radio, in printed 
media, in the public administration and the self-government, in enterprises 
and also trade unions.” While debating a disqualification of these people 
from senior public offices, Mr. Bacinsky added that they “certainly have the 
right to go with us to build the democratic society. But I am convinced that 
they should not lead us.” 
The situation in Poland was very similar to that in Czechoslovakia, 
however, with one remarkable difference: It lasted almost 10 years. Former 
members of the security services who were trained in covert activities, infil- 
tration, bribing, misinformation, blackmail, threats, and so on remained 
connected to all levels of power within the postcommunist state; they oper- 
ated on an informal basis as networks or, formally, as private security agen- 
cies (Los and Zybertowicz 1999, 284). Many of them found employment in 
the police and in the Office for the Protection of State (UOP) (Los 1995, 
122-23). They were associated with many unfortunate decisions of the state 
organs (see, e.g., Los and Zybertowicz 2000, 179-84). The experience of 
both countries suggested that mere structural changes that were not accom- 
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panied by a special personnel policy were inefficient and allowed the old 
networks to permeate new democratic institutions (see Los and Zybertowicz 
2000, 219). 
The old networks may not have necessarily been the active element of 
subversion. The legislatures of both countries also sought to avoid blackmail 
against public officials that could spread during the transition. Those who, 
as members or collaborators of the secret police, had informed on their fellow 
citizens were very vulnerable in this respect. Also vulnerable to blackmailing 
were those who may have been involved in as yet unreported criminal activi- 
ties of the secret police and communist nomenklatura that were typical in 
regimes lacking the rule of law. According to the Czechoslovak Parliamen- 
tary Commission of 17 November (1991), the “only way to prevent black- 
mail, the continued activity of StB collaborators, and a series of political 
scandals that could surface at crucial moments is to clear the government 
and legislative bodies of these collaborators.” Similarly, the then Federal 
Vice-Minister of the Interior, Jan Rum1 (1990), suggestively asked: 
[I]f the KGB has the [copies of Czechoslovak secret police] files, it can 
blackmail whenever it wants. Can anyone who can be blackmailed be 
a representative at any level? There is a parallel here with the situation 
in Czechoslovakia after the war. Lists of Gestapo collaborators were 
given to the communist police. Hence, it was the beginning of its enor- 
mous power, which depended also on blackmail. 
The probability that the KGB possessed copies of the files from East 
Bloc countries was quite high. Soviet “advisors” were traditionally present 
at the Czechoslovak as well as Polish Ministry of the Interior (Kaplan 1999, 
25-26; Groblewski 1999; Andrew and Mitrokhin 2000).31 However, secret 
materials could be in possession of various people because many documents 
went missing.32 For example, a few days after the semi-democratic elections 
in Poland in 1989, General Henryk Dankowski issued an order to locate 
the files of those members of Parliament who had previously been secret 
collaborators in a new catalogue called “Zbior 560”; since January 1990, the 
catalogue has been “missing” (Woyciechowski 1997). 
The affiliation with the repressive apparatus was used as a means to 
blackmail, for example, by the Slovak leader Vladimir Meciar. He several 
times publicly mentioned that he had just found the secret police’s files of 
31. “[Soviet advisors] worked in all of the Soviet bloc countries. . . . In Czechoslovakia, 
all of the important findings and investigation protocols were translated into Russian and 
sent to Moscow. The Moscow center sent instructions, recommendations and . . . questions 
to the main advisor at the Ministry in Prague” (Kaplan 1999, 25-26). 
32. For example, there was a “cleaning” of secret archives at the Polish Ministry of the 
Interior, which took place until 1991 (Grocki 1992, 23, quoted in Los 1995, 136). 
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various people on his table (Mlynarik 1991; Kulan 1991b).33 He then used 
the materials in a successful bid to become the head of the ruling movement 
in Slovakia, Public Against Violence (VPN), and eventually the prime min- 
ister of Czechoslovakia’s Slovak Republic in June 1990 (Naegele 1999). 
Internationally, the experience of the Soviet imperialist politics in 
Central Europe was still alive. Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and they threatened to intervene in Poland at the 
beginning of the 1980s. The Czechoslovak lustration act was passed six 
weeks after the attempted 1991 coup d’etat in the USSR that resurrected 
the activities of former collaborators in Czechoslovakia (Kulan 1991b).34 At 
that time, also, 300,000 Soviet troops were still deployed in the territory of 
former East Germany (Spurny 199 1 ) .35 
Today Russia still perceives Central Europe as a sphere of its power 
interests, and the potential threat of Russia has not vanished, although there 
is no actual danger of another invasion. Russia repeatedly made verbal 
threats to Central European countries that sought to join NATO (see, e.g., 
Czech Republic in NATO 1999). According to the Czech Security and 
Information Service (BIS), Russian information services were always consid- 
ered an important tool of Russian foreign policy. “The policy was character- 
ized by its effort for preserving Russian influence in most countries of the 
former USSR and the Warsaw Pact. . . . They have sought to gain or to 
keep economic influence” (Cinnost zpravodajskych sluzeb SNS 1998-99). 
Central European countries were conscious of the election of the former 
East-Germany-based KGB officer Vladimir Putin as Russian President in 
March 2000 (Vladimir Putin Bio 2002). 
Nevertheless, former Soviet satellites were not merely passive victims 
in the international arena. They, especially Czechoslovakia, provided mili- 
tary support to many terrorist regimes and organizations in the past.36 The 
international contacts of the old networks may provide terrorists with rela- 
tively easy access to weapons, technology of their production, intelligence, 
money laundering, and hence, constitute security risk at the international 
level. 
These security concerns reveal that lustration laws may not be merely 
33.  A possible explanation of these mysterious findings might be the fact that after his 
appointment as the first non-communist Slovak Minister of Interior in January 1990, Meciar 
led a night-time police raid of the secret police archives, allegedly taking his own file and 
the files of his political rivals (Naegele 1999). 
34. This concern was expressed in the speeches of four deputies. 
35. According to the then Czechoslovak Vice-Minister of the Interior, Jan Ruml, “We 
knew that Soviet troops explored [Czechoslovak] border with the former East Germany. There 
was [also] a concentration of the Soviet border forces at [Czechoslovak] border with the USSR, 
which can mean whatever” (Spurny 1991). 
36. Communist “Czechoslovakia was one of the largest arms producers and dealers in 
the world . . . [and] a principal arms supplier to areas of Cold War conflict, including Iraq, 
Ethiopia, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, India, and Vietnam. The Czechs were also a favored supplier 
to numerous terrorist organizations” (Jordan 2002, citation omitted). 
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short-term transitional provisions designed to stabilize new democracy. Al- 
though domestic security risks have been declining, they have not entirely 
vanished. Internationally, NATO membership has changed the security 
concerns in Central European countries. The present problem is preventing 
the old networks from having access to classified NATO materials and to 
continuing arms trade. 
D, Disclosure of the Truth about the Past 
Learning the truth about the past seems to be a powerful idea in many 
transitional demo~racies.~~ People desire to know the information that was 
not accessible to them under the regime, which kept a monopoly on truth 
and used censorship, misinformation and the secret police. Immediately after 
the fall of communism, people could learn a good deal about human rights 
violations, border killings, torture, and concentration camps. Many victims 
shared their personal stories in newspapers, on television and radio. How- 
ever, materials that were collected about them and their relatives by former 
cadres and security organs remained secret. The interest in learning the truth 
led to the requirement to open the archives and publicize the list of those 
who had gathered information and reported about them. 
However, new Czechoslovak and Polish governments prohibited access 
to the secret police archives, and meetings of relevant inquiry commissions 
were also closed (Jelinek 1991; Bachmann 1996). On the perpetuation of 
the secrecy, a journalist who then became the Czechoslovak vice-minister 
of the interior wrote: “The silence regarding the [secret] archives points at 
one unclear suspicion: somebody is hiding somebody. . . . But it’s better to 
know and to forgive than to live in doubts. . . . [I]f we want to start again 
in a different way, we must know above all the truth about us” (Rum1 1990). 
Unveiling the truth was one of the most important motivations of many 
politicians since the beginning of the transition in both countries. A group 
of the Czechoslovak federal deputies proposed to open the secret police files 
and publicize the list of the secret police collaborators in “a civilized way” 
(Necas 1990; Leko 1991). Even the Polish President Aleksander Kwasniew- 
ski, a former communist, wanted the lustration law to provide for free access 
for all citizens to their secret files (Misztal 1999, 44; see generally Los 1995, 
143). 
Seeking the truth was closely related to the right to information 
~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
37. This quest for truth in other transitional countries often includes a search for truth 
about human rights violations-for instance, knowing the truth about disappearances, torture, 
border killings, and so on, which is often pursued through some form of truth commission. 
Although the goals here overlap, lustration laws serve to narrow the search for truth. Truth 
commissions often include victim-centered approaches to the truth, while lustration is clearly 
a perpetrator-centered approach (C. Roederer’s comment to the original version of the paper; 
cf. David 2002b). 
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(Romaszewski 1991, quoted in Los 1995, 127). It included not only the 
information about oneself but also about the candidates in elections. Some 
supporters of the lustration process in both countries held a liberal view on 
that matter: 
[I]f a candidate runs for public office, his eventual voter has the full 
right to know all relevant facts about the candidate, and I also consider 
a relevant fact the information whether he was, or was not a collabora- 
tor of StB, whether he has a criminal record, or whether he suffers from 
unrecoverable diseases. On the other hand, it is the free will of voters 
whether they will elect such a candidate. (Zeman 1991) 
Anybody who runs for a high office has to be prepared for the 
lustration process and for the questions about his own past. There are 
no legal limitations that a [secret police] agent cannot become a presi- 
dent. I think, though, it will not happen. (Olszewski 1995) 
To a certain extent, revealing the truth was a precondition of establish- 
ing democracy in the transitional countries. It could help people gain confi- 
dence in political candidates, regain trust in public institutions, disclaim 
rumors and gossip, and ease the tight atmosphere in society. 
E. Retaliation 
Certain retaliatory tendencies are perhaps natural and emotionally 
driven responses to the representatives of any collapsed totalitarian regime. 
However, in comparison with the postwar waves of street justice, retributive 
laws, wild trials, and ethnic cleansing in some European countries, revenge 
took more subtle forms after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia and 
Poland (Huyse 1995; cf. Novick 1968; Deak, Gross, and Judt 2000). People 
desired the former oppressors to leave public life, and the new political elite 
discovered the potential of lustrations to pursue this objective. Dismissals 
of representatives of the former regime raised concerns among journalists, 
who warned against new human rights violation based on the postwar expe- 
rience and McCarthyism (Battiata 1991; Laber 1992; Rosenberg 1995). 
Popular justice may not have been pursued for several reasons: the long 
duration of the communist system, its domestic character (Huyse 1995, 71), 
the wide continuum between perpetrators and victims, and the fact that 
many of its executors themselves became its victims, all of which precluded 
easy identification of the adversaries. Another reason might be the declin- 
ing, although still omnipresent, brutality of communist regimes in Central 
Europe,3* which contrasted with an extremely violent end of the World War 
38. The case of Poland, which experienced a brutal martial law in the beginning of the 
1980s, only partially fits this profile. 
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11. The political wisdom of the first leaders was another factor: The Czech 
Velvet revolutionaries, aware of the postwar waves of retribution in Czecho- 
slovakia, sought to neutralize popular desires for revenge with the slogan 
“we are not like them.” Likewise, the Polish Solidarity leaders, faced with 
the then-still-powerful communist clique, drew “a thick line after the 
Although a large part of the population might have initially embraced the 
desire for vengeance, vengeance has gradually become an exclusive agenda 
of political radicalism. The decline of this tendency over time indicates that 
the Czech lustration law, approved less than two years after the fall of com- 
munism, might have stronger retributive motives than the Polish one, which 
was passed in 1997. 
Indeed, the allegations of institutionalized retaliation and its denial 
were brought by 17 deputies in the Czechoslovak lustration debate. Deputy 
Rynda (1991), for instance, called it “legal violence,” Deputy Ransdorf 
(1991) labeled it “inquisition and McCarthyism,” and Deputy J. Cemy 
(199 1) saw it as “a proxy for the inability to prosecute communist crimes.” 
Some deputies argued that the bill constituted a collective guilt and caused 
unjust punishment (Samalik 1991 ). Advocates of lustrations dismissed these 
concerns. According to Deputy Farkas (1991), a reporter on the lustration 
law for the Chamber of the People (one of the houses of Parliament), “during 
the debate of the bill in the [parliamentary] committees, deputies of some 
political groups deliberately brought in an impression of the criminal charac- 
ter of the proposed norm.” Another deputy, Jana Petrova (1991), argued 
that the bill’s sole concern was employment law relationships. This tension 
was highlighted by Deputy Kroupa (1991): “[Oln the one hand, many of 
us are motivated by the spirit of vengeance against representatives of the 
old regime, and on the other hand, there is hysterical fear of the spirit of 
vengeance.” 
F. The Dynamic of Lustration Aims 
A few general conclusions concerning changes in the intensity of the 
aims, their backward- and forward-looking character, and their relationships 
can be traced from the above elaboration. The urgency of the lustration 
motives are largely affected by the length of the unregulated period, particu- 
larly in Poland; some motives declined in intensity, while others changed 
their character or intensified. Demands for personnel changes gradually de- 
39. The attitude of many leaders was also bound by their previous political agenda. Many 
of them, at least nominally, fought for human rights instead of against communism. This also 
reflected the presence of international human rights standards after the fall of communism, 
which were still in a prenatal stage after the war. The agenda of the postwar leadership was 
de-Nazification and retribution in many countries, although many of the then leaders also 
wanted to prevent spontaneous vengeance (Novick 1968, 61 ). 
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creased, with few exceptions, when they were connected with other issues 
brought by media or competing politicians. The focus shifted from general 
demands for the disqualification of members of the repressive apparatus as 
a group toward the dismissal of specific individuals. Also, security concerns 
have changed from the “defense of democracy” to the “fulfillment of the 
obligations toward new allies’’ in NATO. Societal demands for truth re- 
mained unchanged. Even in 2001, people were still demanding that the 
government dismantle the secrecy of the totalitarian police (CTK 2001e). 
Popular retributive desires faded over time, although they were still em- 
braced by certain segments of society. These findings indicate that the need 
for lustrations does not merely occur during the transitional period, on 
which they may have a substantial impact.40 They are also a response to 
the long-term needs of societies with totalitarian experience that have to 
transform their political culture, come to terms with their past, and secure 
a reliable state apparatus in the pursuit of democracy. 
The analysis of the relationship of the lustration motives to the past 
provides insights that may change the perception of the laws as backward- 
looking instruments of transitional justice. With the exception of the retali- 
ation motive, forward-looking motives prevail in the processes of transition. 
The need for personnel discontinuity, for example, is not merely a response 
to the past; rather, it is a response to the continuing activities of the old 
networks during transition. Similarly, the demand for truth revelation is not 
self-serving but has an important forward-looking dimension of helping to 
establish trust in society. The need to protect people from the arbitrariness 
of unregulated stage is clearly a response to the defective features of transi- 
tion. These findings contrast with international commentators’ perception 
of the process as backward-looking and retroactive (e.g., Report of the ILO 
Committee 1992, 7T 79). 
To analyze lustration outcomes, one must examine the complex rela- 
tionships between the aims of lustration. “Personnel discontinuity” and 
“truth revelation” are not only aims in themselves, which are connected to 
the right to remedy and the right to information. They are also parallel 
means that facilitate the pursuit of other legitimate and illegitimate aims. 
Personnel changes enable an actual discontinuity with the past, while truth 
revelation facilitates value discontinuity. The deeper the discontinuity im- 
plemented either by dismissals or truth revelations, the more security needs 
are satisfied, the more institutionalized retaliation is pursued, and the less 
space is left for defamation and the arbitrariness of power. These relation- 
ships are not absolute; they are inherently limited. For instance, the widen- 
ing of personnel changes and truth revelation may reduce security risks only 
~ 
40. The approval of the lustration law and other laws that dealt with the past was used 
as an indicator of the relative success of reforms in the Czech Republic during the initial 
years of transition (Cepl and Gillis 1996). 
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when there are professional replacements for the vacant positions, and when 
the information about the activities of the intelligence does not endanger 
the safety of its agents. 
11. LUSTRATION LAWS 
Every lustration law contains substantive and procedural parts. The 
substantive part determines what positions in the new democratic system 
cannot be automatically filled by the members of the totalitarian repressive 
apparatus. Every lustration law, therefore, contains two lists of positions: 
One is backward-looking and one is forward-looking; the first concerns posts 
in the past power hierarchy and the latter defines democratic posts. 
The Czech Lustration Act is based on the principle of personnel discon- 
tinuity with the past, while the Polish one emphasizes value discontinuity 
through truth revelation. The Polish Lustration Act reflects the changing 
characters of the aims over time. Adopted eight years after the breakdown 
of communism, it was almost impossible to justify personnel discontinuity 
with the past. 
A. The Czech Lustration Act 
The first lustration law was approved in Czechoslovakia on 4 October 
1991 as Act no. 451/1991 Sb.,”l which “prescribes certain prerequisites for 
the exercise of certain positions filled by election, appointment, or assign- 
ment in State organs and organizations of CSFR, CR and SR’ for the period 
of five years.42 Among the 300 federal deputies, 148 voted for the act, 31 
against it, and 22 abstained.43 President Have1 signed the act despite his 
reservations (Report of the ILO Committee 1992, TIT 32-42). Pursuant to 
the petition of 99 deputies, the Constitutional Court of CSFR abrogated 
___ 
41. The original version is available in English (cf. Kritz 1995, 3:312). 
42. In addition to that, the Czech National Council enacted a minor lustration law on 
28 April 1992. It is Act no. 279/1992 Sb., which concerns members of the police and members 
of the prison guard of the Czech Republic. This supplementary act is not examined in this 
paper. Its forward-looking provisions widen the scope of the law in a very minor way and its 
backward-looking provisions are almost identical to Act 451/1991 Sb. 
43. The bill was approved by the deputies of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the 
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-CSL), the 
Public Against Violence (VPN), the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the Movement for 
Self-government Democracy I (HSD I), the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Dem- 
ocratic Party (KDS and LDS), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), 
some deputies of the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Association of Social Democrats 
(ASD), and the club of independent deputies. The clubs of the Civil Movement (OH), HSD 
11, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Social Democratic Party (CSSD), 
some deputies of the SNS, two members of the KDU-CSL, and the CP did not vote for the 
bill (abstained, voted against, did not vote, or refused to be present during voting) (Federal 
Assembly of CSFR 1991). 
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several provisions but upheld the act in its substance on 26 November 1992 
(Pl. US 1/92).44 
The act has not been applied in Slovakia since the split of the federa- 
tion (Explanatory Memorandum 1996, n . l l ) ,  and it formally lost its effect 
there by the end of 1996 (Fisher 1997). Nevertheless, it was twice extended 
in the Czech Republic: on 27 September 1995 as Act 254/1995 Sb. and on 
25 October 2000 as Act 422/2000 Sb. The second extension is not limited. 
In both cases, President Havel tried to veto the but both vetoes 
were overruled by the Chamber. In 2000, more than 36% of Czechs sup- 
ported the extension of the act, and 33% were against it ( I W M  2000). 
On 5 December 2001, pursuant to the petition of a group of deputies, the 
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic upheld the act and its extension 
(Pi. US 9/01).46 
The lustration act procedure can be broken down into the following 
steps: An individual, who holds, applies, or stands for a position specified 
by the act, is required to submit both a certificate issued by the Ministry of 
the Interior about her work for, or collaboration with, the secret police, and 
an affidavit that she did not belong to other groups specified in the act (00 
4 [l] and 4 [3]). If an individual belongs to any group specified in the act, 
the organization is required to terminate her employment contract or trans- 
fer her to a position that is not specified by the act (§ 18 (2); cf. §§ 15, 
16). The publication of the certificate is impermissible without the written 
consent of the citizen ( 8  19).47 
The act applies to elected, appointed, and assigned positions48 in the 
state administration, and high-ranking officers in the army and the Ministry 
of Defense, the Security and Information Service, the police, and the Corps 
44. In addition to other provisions, the court also annulled 5 2 (1) (c) of the lustration 
act (the candidates for secret collaboration). Unlike other categories, the records kept on 
this category were unreliable for the purposes of the act. For example, the collaboration with 
people in this category may have been in initial stages, and they may not have been fully 
aware of that fact. 
45. According to presidential spokesperson L. Spacek, “Mr. President explained his step 
saying that he did not sign the laws in 1995 either because he did not want to justify the 
five-year period of waiting for the bills on civil service.” Spacek said, adding that for this 
reason President “Havel would not allow another five-year waiting period” (CTK 2000b). 
46. The court abrogated some provisions of the minor lustration law that had not been 
previously reviewed. 
47. Any person can object to the termination of her employment at a second-level re- 
gional court instead of the first-level district court (§ 18 [2]) and appeal the decision at the 
High Court (Act no. 99/1963 Sb., 5 10 [2]). According to the Supreme Court (Decision no. 
6:273, 1992), the truthfulness of the certificate issued by the Ministry can be challenged on 
the basis of civil procedures (Act no. 99/1963 Sb., 0 247). Other legal protection in this area 
is guaranteed by the civil code’s protection of the personhood clauses (Act no. 40/1964 Sb., 
$9 11-16). Thereafter a person can submit a constitutional complaint, if her rights are en- 
croached (Act no. 182/1993 Sb., § 72 [I] [a]). 
48. The act concerns only senior positions in the listed organizations, and it does not 
affect employees therein. Some deputies originally proposed widening the scope of the law- 
e.g., by replacing the word positions with the word employment (Farkas 1991). 
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of the Castle Police. It includes senior positions in the offices of the constitu- 
tional organs (the offices that support the presidency, the Chambers, the 
government, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court), the public 
media, and the management of enterprises where the majority shareholder is 
the state. The requirements also concern academic officials in management 
positions; the posts of judges, assessors, prosecutors, investigators, state nota- 
ries, and some security-sensitive concession-based trades.49 Every individual 
older than 18 years of age is entitled to apply to the Ministry of the Interior 
for the issue of a lustration certificate ($ 8 [l]). The certificate and affidavit 
are not required for citizens born after 1 December 1971 (Act no. 422/2000 
Sb., Q 1). 
Backward looking provisions concern those parts of the repressive appa- 
ratus that are proclaimed incompatible with the above-specified positions 
in state organs and  organization^.^' It includes members of the State Security 
(StB), its collaborators at the specified levels, some higher Communist Party 
 official^,^' the political management of the Corps of National Security, mem- 
bers of the People’s Militias,52 members of the purge  committee^,^^ and 
students, scholars, or visitors at the specified Soviet KGB and other polit- 
ical-security universities between 1948 and 1989. 
B. The Polish Lustration Act 
The Polish Sejm adopted the lustration bill in April 1997. Among its 
460 members, 214 voted in its favor, 162 against, and 16 abstained (Misztal 
1999, 44). The Polish senate approved the bill in May 1997. Among 100 
senators, 47 voted for it while 33 voted against it.54 President Kwasniewski 
49. It concerns trades in the area of development, production, repair, and trade with 
firearms, weapons, and ammunitions, etc. (see Act no. 455/1991 Sb., 8 27 [2] and app. no. 3 ) .  
50. Two sections of the lustration act that concern the repressive apparatus: $3 2 and 
3. The latter is only a modification of the former. The following discussion focuses on the 
more important section 2 of the act. 
51. It includes the top echelons of the Communist Party with the exemption of those 
who held these positions during the period between 1 January 1968 and 1 May 1969. The 
reason for this exception is that since the selection of Alexander Dubcek as the secretary 
general, the CP tried to launch social and political reforms of the totalitarian system, which 
might have led to the abandonment of authoritarian ways of governance and to the building 
of “socialism with a human face.” This attempt was halted by the military intervention of 
the Warsaw Pact armies on 21 August 1968. 
52. The People’s Militias were paramilitary units of the Communist Party, which helped 
to facilitate the communist takeover in 1948 and conducted various repressive tasks during 
the communist regime (Bilek and Pilat 1995). 
53. These purge committees were established ad hoc after the communist takeover in 
1948 and after the Soviet invasion into Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to facilitate broad 
arbitrary exclusions of hundreds of thousands of people from their posts for political reasons 
(see PI. US 1/92). 
54. The bill was supported mainly by the Solidarity Election Action (AWS), the Free- 
dom Union (UW), and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). Opposition to the bill came mainly 
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(former member of the ex-communist SLD) signed the bill in June 1997, 
although he later requested the Constitutional Tribunal to abrogate some 
of its provisions (Constitutional Watch: Poland 1997a). The act “on the 
revealing of work or service in State security organs or of collaboration with 
them between 1944 and 1990 by persons holding public positions” (Polish 
Lustration Act) came into force on 3 August 1997 (Constitutional Watch: 
Poland 199713) and was several times amended.55 On 21 October 1998, the 
Constitutional Tribunal upheld the act (Sygn. K. 24/98). However, in a 
subsequent decision of 10 November 1998, it found two of its provisions 
unconstitutional (Sygn. K. 39/97). In 1999, 56% of Poles supported 
lustrations, while 31% were against them (CBOS 1999). 
The main feature of the Polish lustration act is verification of affidavits 
submitted by persons who apply for positions specified by the act as to 
whether they worked or collaborated with security services of the communist 
regime (arts. 2 , 3 ,  4, and 7).The substance of these affidavits, if they reveal 
collaboration, is officially published in “Monitor Polski” (the Polish Moni- 
tor), the government gazette (art. 11). 
The act establishes a special lustration prosecutor, the spokesperson of 
the public interest (RIP) (art. 17), and authorizes the Warsaw Court of Ap- 
peal as the lustration court (art. 1). It sets a special judicial procedure that 
is directly connected to the regular criminal law (art. 19).56 The process can 
be initiated by the RIP at the court, and a member of Parliament can propose 
its initiation (art. 18).57 
The court decides whether the affidavit is true or false, or orders a sus- 
pension of the case. The lustrated person is in the position of an accused 
according to criminal law (art. 20) and she can appeal the judgment (art. 
23 [21). The results of the lustration are published in the Polish Monitor 
(art. 22 141). A false affidavit is sanctioned by the loss of moral qualification 
for 10 years, which implies the loss of the right of access to any public posi- 
tions for that duration (art. 30). 
Public positions affected by the act’s forward-looking provisions include 
the highest constitutional officials, namely the president of the republic; 
deputies and senators; and persons assigned, elected, or appointed by the 
~~ ~~ 
from the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which is led by the ex-communist Social Demo- 
cratic Party (SDRP) (Constitution Watch: Poland 1997a). 
55. See Dz.u.99.42.428, Dz.u.99.57.618, Dz.u.99.62.681, Dz.u.99.63.701, Dz.u.00.43.488, 
Dz.u.00.50.600. In 2002, the coalition dominated by former communists narrowed the lustra- 
tion law (see Dz.u.02.14.128). This change is not examined in this paper (see also supra note 
10). Center-right deputies asked the Constitutional Tribunal for their review (PAP 2002a). 
56. If a procedure is not regulated by the act, it is regulated by the Code of Criminal 
Procedures. 
57. The procedure can also be launched at the request of a publicly active person who 
was publicly denounced of working or collaborating with security organs (arts. 8 and 18a [ 3 ] ) .  
I t  can also be launched at the request of a person who demands a decision that she was forced 
to such collaboration (art. 18a [4]). 
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president and other constitutional organs. The provisions also include senior 
public officials, judges, prosecutors, and advocates and those who occupy 
leading positions in public media (art. 3). 
The backward-looking provisions of the Polish lustration act concern 
positions held in the several security organs between 1944 and 1990, such 
as the Ministry of Public Security, the Committee for Public Security Affairs, 
and their subordinated units; and the Security Service (secret police), army 
intelligence, army counterintelligence, and other services of the military 
forces. The lustration act also covers civil and military organs and the insti- 
tutions of foreign states that engage in tasks similar to the aforementioned 
organs (art. 2).58 
111. THE EVALUATION OF THE LUSTRATION POLICIES 
This part evaluates the extent to which the application of the laws has 
fulfilled the expectations and compares the impact of the laws in both societ- 
ies. It analyzes the legal lustration stage in the Czech Republic (1991-2001) 
and in Poland ( 1999-2001),59 and it also examines the post-lustration situa- 
tion in Slovakia, where several negative features of the unregulated stage 
had been reestablished during the rule of Vladimir Meciar (1994-98). 
A. Minimal Justice: Personnel Discontinuity with the Totalitarian 
Apparatus 
The Polish lustration act substantially differs from the Czech one with 
respect to discontinuity. In the Czech Republic, a positive lustration means 
that a person is not eligible for a position in the new democratic regime, 
which leads directly to her disqualification. In Poland, lustration serves as 
a means of verifying the truthfulness of an affidavit submitted by a candidate 
for a specified office declaring whether she worked for the repressive appara- 
tus of the former regime. This process can lead to the conviction that a 
person is dishonest, and as a consequence, she can be barred from a position 
in the democratic government for 10 years. The Polish lustration law actu- 
ally divides high public officials into three groups: those who did not work 
or collaborate with the past security organs, those who did so but revealed 
the fact, and those who failed to confess their past. Only the third group 
could be dismissed. Thus, in Poland, the requirement of discontinuity with 
58. The Polish police state of the 1980s is analyzed in Los and Zybertowicz (1999, 263- 
59. Although the Polish lustration act was approved in 1997, the process only started 
68). 
1 January 1999 because of the lack of political will to establish lustration institutions. 
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the past regime is met only conditionally, whereas in the Czech Republic, 
it is satisfied directly. 
In reality, however, both acts partially converge in respect to this aim. 
In the Czech Republic, the Act is sometimes avoided by an informal “autho- 
rization.” It means that a person who is not eligible for a specified position 
because she does not meet the lustration criteria is authorized temporarily 
to hold a position. A few such cases were related to key privatization institu- 
tions.60 According to lawyer Petr Toman, the former spokesman of the Par- 
liamentary Committee of 17 November, “entrusting people with exercising 
some leading [positions] was the way of circumventing the screening law” 
( 2000c). 
In Poland, after submitting an affidavit revealing collaboration with 
the communist repressive apparatus, those involved are in some cases dis- 
missed, or there is pressure for their dismissal (PAP 2002b). For example, 
on 2 March 1999, after publication of the first list of affidavits revealing 
collaboration with security forces, Hanna Suchocka (UW), then minister 
of justice, “reacted swiftly, demoting two district procurators who had ac- 
knowledged their collaboration. At the same time, she recommended that 
the presidents of courts dismiss those judges whose names had been pub- 
lished [as secret collaborators]” (Constitutional Watch: Poland 1999). Some 
anti-lustration-oriented Polish media interpreted it as a “punishment for 
truth” (Paradowska 1999a), whereas some pro-lustration media considered 
the lack of discontinuity as the main shortcoming of the process (Woycie- 
chowski 1997). 
The Czech lustration act would meet the criterion of discontinuity in 
leading positions if it were properly enforced. The Polish lustration act does 
not formally preclude such discontinuity because the disclosure of the truth 
about one’s past can be a reason for dismissal. However, these dismissals 
seem to occur only rarely, highlighted and criticized by the media. Conse- 
quently, discontinuity with the past in Poland, attributable to the lustration 
law, cannot be substantiated. 
In the Czech Republic, the scale of discontinuity, represented by the 
number of people who left their posts after the law was enacted, is difficult 
to estimate. There are no comprehensive statistics concerning the application 
of the lustration act. By November 1992, 168,928 lustration certificates had 
60. For instance, the section of the National Property Fund (FNM) that was responsible 
for exacting claims was led by the alleged former secret police officer Milan Plevka. The 
FNM spokeswoman said that Plevka was only entrusted with leading the section and was not 
appointed as its director (CTK 2000~). This was not the first scandal in the FNM, one of 
the key institutions in the privatization process. In 1999, journalists found that its chairperson, 
Jan Stiess, had been using a false lustration certificate (Navara and Baroch 2001). In another 
case related to privatization, D. Triska, allegedly a secret collaborator, “held” a position of 
federal vice-minister of finance under Vaclav Klaus (ODS). Triska was considered a founding 
father of the voucher privatization, which largely favored high communist cadres; he was 
later dismissed (Hejl 2002). 
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been issued, among which 11,363 were positive (PI. US 1/92).6l According 
to information provided by the Ministry of the Interior in March 2001, ap- 
proximately 345,000 lustration certificates, among them around 3% positive, 
had been issued since the law took effect (Sulc 2001). According to a poll 
conducted in the Czech Republic in 2000,32% of respondents thought that 
the lustration law was beneficial to democracy, while 27% held the opposite 
view; 29% thought that it was beneficial to the personnel situation in enter- 
prises and offices, while 30% held the opposite opinion (IVVM 2000).62 
Besides their different means of pursuing discontinuity with the past, 
the scope of the laws determine their capacity to reach this aim. Both lustra- 
tion laws are quite narrowly drawn. In the vertical dimension, they do not 
concern the entire public service. They only apply to leading positions in 
the administration, although they concern all members of the justice system. 
At the horizontal level, neither of these acts regulates the economic sector. 
This means that members of the former repressive apparatus can run “their” 
businesses in many areas.63 Unfortunately, their enterprises were often asso- 
ciated with word tunneling, which reflected mismanagement, nontranspar- 
ency, fraud, and bankruptcy. For example, in the Czech Republic, former 
secret police agent Vaclav Junek, who was allegedly involved in an industrial 
espionage in the French chemical industry, became the general manager of 
the Chemapol Group; and former nomeklaturu cadre, Lubomir Soudek, be- 
came the general manager of Skoda Plzen. The enterprises managed by them 
were almost bankrupted (Spurny and Kontra 1998; cf. Sykorova 2000). 
Moreover, Soudek tried to supply weapons to the regimes under the U.N. 
embargo (Spurny and Kontra 1998). 
In Poland, even if the lustration law concerned the business sphere, it 
61. This number did not include the abrogated category (c). However, it did include many 
election candidates, those who applied for the certificate because of their own interest, and 
members of organizations that conditioned their membership on negative lustrations, such as 
the Confederation of Political Prisoners (Drobny 2000) .  Since “legal” lustrations were launched 
in 1991, the number also covered certificates issued for the Slovak part of the CSFR. On the 
other hand, many of those who had “certain contacts” with the secret police might have been 
deterred from applying for a listed position and, therefore, be also affected by the law. 
62. The question of whether the law was beneficial to the personnel situation in enter- 
prises and offices is disputable, since the act does not concern enterprises and the public may 
not be aware of that fact. The Czech lustration act only concerns the management of state 
enterprises and some security-sensitive concession-based trades. Public demand for lustration 
in the private sphere would be very hard to defend. See below. 
63. According to a survey conducted from 1992 to 1996, membership in the communist 
elite is the most significant variable for predicting membership in the new business elite (Ma- 
teju and Rehakova 1997, quoted in Tucker 1999). These data offer three interpretations. First, 
the lustration law is unsuccessful in providing discontinuity with the past because it does not 
affect the business sphere. This was expected by the public but was legally unjustifiable and 
therefore was omitted from the law. Second, the requirement of discontinuity was met because 
the former nomenklatura left the state administration and entered the private sector. The expla- 
nation for their success could be their human capital and management skills, none of which, 
however, was associated with the profile of communist cadres. Third, the requirement of discon- 
tinuity was met only partially. Cadres who left the state administration have nonetheless kept 
their contacts with those who stayed. Their social capital explains their business success. 
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was enacted too late to prevent old cadres from taking advantage of their 
social capital during the massive privatization process.“ In the “capital con- 
version process,” former nomenklatura transformed political capital for eco- 
nomic capital, which it later utilized to regain political power; security 
networks played a vital role in this process, providing intelligence, interna- 
tional contact, skills and protection (Los and Zyberetowicz 2000, 20). 
The approval of the lustration law in the Czech Republic and the ab- 
sences of lustration in Poland might be one of the factors that explains 
different patterns of the grand-scale corruption, by which many nomenkla- 
tura cadres legalized their informal ownership of huge enterprises. While the 
“capital conversion process” took place during all the transformation period 
in Poland, the “tunneling” of the Czech economy became only apparent in 
the midst of the 1990s. It seems that the Czech lustration law had been fairly 
effective in decreasing the influence of old cadres on politics and economic 
transformation within a few years of its enactment. The law made keeping 
or deploying their people in crucial decision-making positions in the priva- 
tization process difficult. The business class of nomenklatura cadres could no 
longer rely on their connections to the Communist Party (KSCM), whose 
political influence also diminished due to their repeated electoral defeats 
and political is0lation.6~ Thus, the old power networks had to find other 
ways to pursue their objectives: They exercised their influence over parties 
that were committed to pursuing privatization via liberal provisions on fi- 
nancing of political parties.@ 
Although both lustration laws have been found quite narrow in their 
scopes, they substantially differ in their backward-looking aspects. Unlike 
the Czech lustration law, the Polish one does not include high communist 
echelons as possible initiators of human rights violations. It includes only 
members of and collaborators with the secret police and other security 
64. See, e.g., the FOZZ scandal, the BIG scandal (Los and Zybertowicz 2000, 165, 173). 
65. The minimal discontinuity with its Czechoslovak predecessor is probably the main 
reason why the Czech Communist Party (KSCM) remains in political isolation. Until 2002, 
none of its members has ever been elected to a leading post of the Czech Parliament. President 
Have1 never invited KSCM to political consultations, as he did the other parties. And at 
the party congress held 14-16 March 1997 in Bohumin, even its ideologically closest potential 
ally, the Czech Social Democratic Party, approved a statement of noncooperation with KSCM 
at the central level. 
66. The then version of Act no. 424/1991 Sb., on political parties, enables unlimited 
sponsorship of parties without any sanction for eventual false sponsorship. The center-right 
parties of the then-govemment coalition, especially ODS and ODA, received millions of 
Czech crowns (CZK) as gifts from official or fake sponsors. However, the “sponsorships” that 
accompanied the privatization process were not limited to the past cadres. For example, one 
of the main sponsors of the ODS was former tennis player Milan Srejber, who co-privatized 
an iron-industry enterprise in Trinec. In another case, a company that belonged to Agroplast, 
which smuggled jet bombers (MiG-21s) to North Korea, let the ODS use its helicopter in 
electoral campaigns (Kmenta 2000b). Later, the government of Social Democrats (1998- 
2002), backed by ODs, deepened special relations with old nomenklatura “experts” (Jordan 
2002b). 
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branches.67 In Poland, even some lustration opponents criticize the lack of 
de-communization, which is actually a request for the widening of the law 
(Paradowska 199913). Nevertheless, the number of affected communist up- 
purutchiks is almost insignificant in the Czech Republic.68 
Despite the narrow composition of both laws, to my knowledge, in 
neither country did the old totalitarian networks in the state commit serious 
human rights violations after the laws were enacted. However, the institu- 
tions of the criminal justice system are appallingly inactive in the prosecu- 
tion of communist crimes. Given the scale of gross human rights  violation^,^^ 
the trials of their perpetrators are rare in both the Czech Republic?’ and 
P01and.~’ 
Abuses of state power were restored in Slovakia after its lustration 
policy was dropped. The Slovak Information Service (SIS) allegedly em- 
ployed a large number of former secret police agents, including its first dep- 
uty, Jaroslav Svechota (Butora 1999). The SIS was involved in several 
serious incidents that violated essential democratic principles. It placed 
under surveillance the then-opposition parties and politicians; monitored 
churches, trade unions, and journalists critical of Vladimir Meciar’s govern- 
ment; organized a kidnapping of the son of the then Slovak President Michal 
Kovac Jr. (Radio Prague 1999~); sabotaged public meetings; and blew up 
the cars of journalists. These illegal activities were carried out by a secret 
52nd department that was under the direct command of Mr. Svechota 
(Nemecek 1999). 
In this case, the abuses of power are associated with former secret po- 
licemen. One cannot claim that these abuses are consequences of their pres- 
ence. One can merely claim that had the Czechoslovak lustration law 
remained valid in Slovakia, Mr. Svechota and others might not be allowed 
to work at the SIS. If the power abuses were politically motivated, and some 
commentators indeed suggest a link with the PM Meciar, then the political 
elite would have to find different ways to intimidate its opponents.72 
67. This is the reason why lustration is distinguished from de-communizaation in Poland, 
while the term lustration also includes partial de-communization in the Czech Republic. 
68. For instance, the category of Party secretaries at the district level is one of the widest. 
The Czech Republic consisted of 72 districts before 1989. The total number of the former 
Party apparatchiks affected might be several hundreds. 
69. See supra notes 22 and 23.  
70. By 1 November 2001, nine people were condemned, among them five received sus- 
pended sentences in the Czech Republic (Prehled pri$udu 2001). 
71. In Poland, there has been “only one major trial of persons responsible for Stalinist 
crimes. . . . [It] resulted in convictions . . . for all twelve defendants, former functionaries of 
the Ministry of Public Security. . . . [One of them] received a suspended sentence” (Los and 
Zybertowicz 2000, 186). The reason for these results in Poland might be “[p]olitical manipula- 
tion, as well as the intimidation of judges, prosecutors and witnesses, [which] have been well- 
documented” (2000, 187). 
72. Had the law been in force, Meciar himself might not have been eligible to hold the 
appointed post of the prime minister, depending on the category of his alleged collaboration 
with the secret police (Naegele 1999). 
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B. The Protection of Rights and the Need for Legal Regulation of 
the Process 
Both lustration laws provide individuals with the opportunity to defend 
themselves from defamation and rumors of collaboration with the former 
secret police. In the Czech Republic, anyone can request a lustration certifi- 
cate, and in Poland, a defamed person can require the decision of the lustra- 
tion court. Nobody can be lustrated without previous consent, and in both 
countries anyone can challenge the decision at the court. 
The lustration laws had a different impact on public life in the Czech 
Republic than that it had in Poland, while the absence of the law to a large 
extent influenced politics in Slovakia. In Poland, after three years of the 
process, it is difficult to determine whether it fulfilled the expectation of 
calming the tense political atmosphere or deepened the political crisis. On 
the one hand, the law offered a way out of political tensions and mutual 
mistrust. For example, after the lustration act was passed, Deputy T. 
Karwowski publicly accused Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek of collaboration. 
Buzek responded by asking the Spokesperson of the Public Interest, Judge 
Nizienski, to examine his affidavit first. Nizienski agreed and announced 
that he had found no grounds for requesting the lustration court to examine 
the Prime Minister’s affidavit (Constitution Watch: Poland 1999). 
On the other hand, every single step of the Polish lustration process 
is interpreted as a political scandal, and much of the criticism seems to be 
negatively biased. Some journalists reach disavowal conclusions about per- 
sons concerned before the lustration process ends or even at its very initia- 
tion. The provision that every member of Parliament may propose an 
initiation of the verification of affidavits submitted by people holding state 
offices is considered a tool of political struggle (Paradowska 1999b), although 
without the provision, politicians would continue to denounce their rivals 
at their press conferences. A proposal to initiate the lustration process is 
considered a dirty orchestrated accusation (Michnik 1999), and a decision 
of the lustration court is treated as final although pending an appeal (Para- 
dowska 2001). The lustration of candidates for high state offices, namely 
the presence of the presidential candidates at the lustration court, was inter- 
preted as their discrediting (Baczynski 2000) despite the fact that both Lech 
Walesa and Aleksander Kwasniewski had a chance to clear themselves from 
suspicion. They would not have this chance without the law and the regular 
lustration process. Moreover, a reprint of the officially published names of 
those who revealed their collaboration in one newspaper is portrayed as a 
scandal by other newspapers (Check0 1999). The question is, How could 
people exercise control over public officials without knowing their pasts? 
According to the mrio legis of the lustration law, the public was supposed 
to give its compromised leaders a second chance in exchange for truth. Thus, 
the criticism in fact insists on the second chance without truth revelation. 
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The contaminated lustration discourse might be a result of the long 
pre-lustration period when the theme was used quite arbitrarily to discredit 
political opponents. The situation may settle as time passes. Such optimism 
was manifested in the first lustration decision of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal: 
In the present political life, we can observe . . . allegations of politicians 
regarding the fact of collaboration of particular persons with security 
organs as well as questioning the truthfulness of already submitted affi- 
davits. This is a very bad habit. [However] looking from this point of 
view . . . the carriage of the lustration proceeding . . . will without 
doubt contribute to the recovery of the situation.” (Sygn. K. 24/98, 
part 3.3) 
Obviously, there will always be people, journalists, and “politicians on 
the right as well as on the left who would never be persuaded even by the 
decisions of the Lustration Court” (Gottesman 1999). However, this should 
not surprise anybody. Some people will never be convinced by the decisions 
taken at any level of any judicial system. Moreover, certain mistrust is logi- 
cally needed as the precondition of trust. In democracy, people cannot un- 
critically accept an authority as in a monarchy or a church. 
The poisonous atmosphere that surrounds the lustration process also 
originates in the lack of wide social consensus on the definition and causes 
of collaboration. Any legal definition has an inherently dichotomous char- 
acter, dividing a continuum of possibilities according to those that conform 
with the definition and those that do not. The definition of collaboration, 
for example, transfers the complexity of human nature, with all its weak- 
nesses and ambiguities, and here exposed to the extreme situations of totali- 
tarianism, to binary categories of truth versus lie, and collaboration versus 
not collaboration. Many intellectuals, including former dissidents such as 
Adam Michnik in Poland or Petr Uhl in the Czech Republic, recognized 
these difficulties, stood by former oppressors, and became opponents of the 
process. However, such approach, which blames the system rather the indi- 
vidual for the act of collaboration, deprives individuals of their humanity, 
their capacity to be responsible for their acts. If the human agency was ab- 
sent in former communist regimes, the democratic transformation could 
never occur. In a way, this inclination to blame the system may arise in 
response to any legal provisions that regulate social relations, especially 
those of penal law. However, the fact that a murderer may in fact be a victim 
of society because she is unemployed and had a difficult childhood does not 
lead to the abolition of criminal sanctions. Of course, lustration processes 
do have borderline cases, such as those of Jan Kavan in the Czech Republic 
and Marian Jurczyk in Poland (Rzeczpospolita, 3 October 2002). But neither 
do borderline criminal cases lead to the abandonment of penal code. 
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In Slovakia, mutual accusations have continued even in the post- 
Meciar era (Radio Praguel999d), and there has been no mechanism for their 
resolution since the lustration policy was abandoned. Notwithstanding, lus- 
tration does not seem to be an issue on the present Slovak political agenda.73 
For the second round of the 1999 presidential elections, Slovaks chose two 
candidates, Rudolf S c h ~ s t e r ~ ~  and Vladimir Meciar (Naegele 1999). The two 
might fall within the scope of the Czechoslovak lustration act if it was ap- 
plied and, in addition, if it concerned popularly elected offices.75 
In the Czech Republic, the lustration act has substantially helped re- 
duce political tensions although scandals typical of the pre-lustration stage 
are still reported. The main problem is that the act has not entirely stopped 
the leaking of materials, executed often on a selective basis, which has led 
to other political scandals. For instance, before the 1992 Czechoslovak par- 
liamentary elections, an incomplete list of secret police collaborators was 
published (Cibulka 1992). The same list was appended and reprinted in 
1999 (Cibulka 1999) and is now available online. Leaked materials some- 
times directly target certain individuals. For example, unauthorized materi- 
als about prominent Czech politician Jan Kavan are often published (e.g., 
a recent book of the Kavan’s secret police file) (Vachalovsky and Bok 2000; 
cf. Goldsmith 2000; Remias 2000). 
President Havel con- 
demned the leakage, pointing out that the materials were not reliable and 
caused “immeasurable number of human tragedies’’ (Michnik 1993). Despite 
the condemnation, Havel himself did not express much of his trust in Kavan 
when he hesitated to appoint him the minister in the social democratic 
government after the 1998 parliamentary elections (Pergler and Kubik 1998; 
cf. CTK 2002). 
There are several possible explanations for the leakage. The reason that 
attracts the media is usually the past of a person who holds a high public 
office. In the Kavan case, it was his high position as the minister of foreign 
affairs (1998-2002) and the president of the UN General Assembly (2002- 
3); the evidence procedure that led a court to a conclusion that he was not 
The leaked information may not be 
73. While this paper was being revised for print, the Slovak newspaper Sme (21 October 
2002) identified nine members of the newly elected Parliament, including the minister of 
foreign affairs, as alleged collaborators with the secret police. The chairman of the Slovak 
Confederation of Political Prisoners, L. Pittner, expressed hope that the lustration issue would 
be reopened after Slovakia receives an invitation to join NATO. Nevertheless, the alleged 
collaborators mostly belonged to the “gray caFegory c,” which was abrogated by the Czechoslo- 
vak Constitutional Court in 1991 (see PI. US 1/92). 
74. In 1992, Schuster had to leave the post of the Czechoslovak ambassador to Canada 
as a consequence of the lustration act (Sedlak 2001). 
75. Cf. supra note 48 and 72. 
76. Some politicians and government officials, including Marian Gula, the head of the 
Slovak Office for the Investigation and Prosecution of Communist Crimes and former head 
of the same office in the Czech Republic, confirmed that Cibulka’s lists are correct. The 
problem is that the lists include also category c, which was abrogated from the lustration law. 
. 
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a conscious collaborator despite his allegedly frequent meetings with the 
secret police members, one of which was broadcast on a Czech private TV; 
his 1996 Senate campaign, in which two former secret police members par- 
ticipated; and his profile as a “convicted liar” by a court of justice (Spurny 
1998; Larsen 1998; Pecina 1998; CTK 1998; Tucker 1999, 85-87). 
Information leakage may also reflect the narrow scope of the law. The 
public and even some state officials still consider that some exponents of 
the previous regime should be included in the law in order to prevent them 
from getting influential positions such as in the business sector (Spurny and 
Kontra 1998) and media77 or from being honored by state awards.l* The 
leakage might be a result of the belated enactment of the law. For a few 
months following the breakdown of communism, many people, including 
former secret policemen, had access to secret police files, and “conditions 
at the [Czechoslovak] ministry [of the interior] were such that nearly every- 
one was able to walk away with StB documents” (Report of Parliamentary 
Commission of 17 November 1991). 
The prevention of information leakage could be supported by other 
acts, such as the Protection of the Classified Data Act, the Freedom of Infor- 
mation Act, or the protection of personality clauses of the criminal law and 
the civil code. In any case, both lustration laws authorize certain state organs 
to keep control over the classified documents. Consequently, senior state 
officials should be held accountable if the leakage comes from their institu- 
tion. 
C. The Protection of the National Security and Public Safety 
Both lustration acts seek to safeguard democracy, though they differ in 
the means to achieve this aim. In the Czech Republic, the threat to democ- 
racy is reduced by removing some members of the totalitarian machinery 
from leading positions. In Poland, a revelation of past collaboration is offi- 
cially published that gives the public an opportunity to control the steps 
77. Both lustration laws include only leading positions in public media. Although the 
Czech lustration act enables holders of media licenses to require lustration of certain specified 
posts therein, this is a mere option that does not preclude, for example, former misinformation 
specialists from working in the media. Thus, in 1992, the Federal Security and Information 
Service delivered a list of names of 262 journalists to the Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart. 
These individuals allegedly had been agents of StB and were said to have destabilized society 
after 1989 with biased information. Pithart in turn handed the list to the Czech National 
Council, and shortly after, it was published (Mlynar 1992). 
78. In October 1998, a prestigious Czech award was to be given to the former Mayor of 
Vienna, Mr. Helmut Zilk. However, after information stating that Mr. Zilk had allegedly 
collaborated with the Czechoslovak communist intelligence was passed to the office of the 
Czech president, the invitation to Zilk was canceled. After a few weeks of international scan- 
dal, Mr. Zilk received an apology from President Have1 (CTK and ZAH 1998; HOP et al. 
1998; cf. Plavec 1999). 
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taken by these officials, while a false affidavit leads to their removal from 
public office. 
However, if they do not hold prescribed leading positions, former mem- 
bers of repressive apparatus are not subjected to the lustration process. Nei- 
ther of the lustration acts requires the removal of these people from their 
employment in central state institutions. Since both lustration acts only affect 
high-ranking positions in security departments, and given that the secret 
services of communist countries were subordinated to the KGB and that 
Russian security services still perform activities in the territory of Central 
Europe, the question is whether their narrow scopes are sufficient for the 
new member states of The Polish lustration law is even more le- 
nient than the Czech one in the employment of former agents in the new 
security organs. As a result, 8% of the Polish police officers and two-thirds 
of the employees of the Office for the Protection of the State (UOP) were . 
former SB operatives in the late 1990s (Los and Zybertowicz 2000, 132, 
based on various resources). The rest of them largely worked for private 
security and detective companies, which employ approximately 100,000 
people (Los and Zybertowicz 1999, 284, based on data from 1994). 
New democracies also have a common problem with law enforcement. 
For example, in 2001, the Czech Minister of the Interior, Stanislav Gross, 
announced that negative lustration certificates were illegally issued to many 
former members of the army intelligence (CTK 2001a). This resulted in the 
checking of 150,000 issued lustration certificates. It was found that 117 ille- 
gal certificates had been issued mostly in 1992 as a result of “incorrect analy- 
sis” of documents (CTK Z O O ~ C ) . ~ ~  Czech press reported that NATO officials 
were unsettled by the scandal (CTK 2001b). 
The Czech lustration law was unable to stop suspicious arm trade. At 
the official level, economic slowdown and increasing unemployment at the 
end of the 1990s forced the social-democratic government to implement a 
more lenient licensing policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by 
Jan Kavan, for example, agreed with the arms export to Sri Lanka and Iran. 
At the unofficial level, some companies had been supplying countries like 
Algeria, Libya, Iran, and North Korea for a number of years (Jordan 2002a; 
Kmenta 2000a; Stroehlein 1998). 
In a way, it is a tradition. The Czech Republic has very good relations 
from the past with these countries. [It] has a number of receivables from 
the communist era there. It is still trying to have them repaid. Czech 
79. However, lustration law is not the only law that regulates security screening. Czech 
NATO officials are subjected to security checks conducted by the National Security Ofice 
(NBU) pursuant to Act no. 148/1998 Sb. 
80. Eight of their holders worked at the Ministry of Defense; according to the minister, 
all of them would be dismissed. One of them worked at the Ministry of the Interior, and 23 
worked in the state administration. 
422 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 
businessmen have really “special” relations with local politicians and 
authorities. Because of its risky nature, any deal with such a country, 
both legal and illegal, increases the value of the bid. The amount of 
money involved is able to shut the eyes of politicians, officials or busi- 
nessmen in Prague over problem that may arise. (Kmenta 2000a, quoted 
in Jordan 2002a). 
The lustration law was hardly enforced in Slovakia before 1993, it was 
entirely inactive after 1993, and it formally expired in 1996. In 1994-98, a 
semi-democratic regime81 was established, backed by the Slovak Information 
Service (Naegele 1997b) and politically supported by Russia (Naegele 
1997a). In addition to the abuses of power (see part 3A), former secret po- 
licemen working in the SIS performed activities to prevent the Czech Re- 
public and Hungary from joining NATO. Based on the Slovak Mitro’s 
parliamentary report, Radio Prague reported that “SIS carried out two plans 
to achieve this aim in the Czech Republic. ‘Operation Neutron’ and ‘Opera- 
tion Dezo’ sought to activate neo-Nazi groups and provoke racially moti- 
vated, mostly anti-Roma incidents in order to discredit Prague” (Radio 
Prague 1999a). The work of the SIS in Hungary was also oriented to the 
supply of arms to organized crime and some actions toward the disputed 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam (Radio Prague 199913). These reasons might ex- 
plain why Slovakia was temporarily suspended from the EU enlargement 
negotiations, and unlike the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, it did 
not become a member of NATO in 1999,82 which is considered a vital na- 
tional security interest of the Central European countries. 
The lustration laws, even if properly enforced, can only solve some of 
the security problems. The security risks that originated in the past also 
require additional legislation to regulate private security companies, access 
to classified materials, export and proliferation of weapons, and so on. 
D. The Disclosure of the Truth about the Past 
Before the law was enacted, critics of lustrations often relativized the 
truth that could come from secret police archives and from secret policemen 
themselves. In 1994, a prominent Polish journalist and a critic of lustrations, 
81. For the characteristics of the situation in Slovakia, see US.  Department of State, 
County Reports 1996-99. 
82. This does not establish a link between the existence of the lustration law and NATO 
membership. Indeed, Poland would be the first falsifier of this hypothesis. It merely shows 
that the subversive activities of the former security networks can reach an intensity that may 
raise international concern. Besides, there were other reasons to exclude Slovakia from the 
EU/NATO expansion, such as its approval of the language law, which violated the rights of 
the Hungarian minority; the government’s manipulation of the referendum on NATO acces- 
sion; the government’s failure to comply with the decisions of the Constitutional Court; and 
so on. 
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Adam Michnik, wrote, “The truth must be revealed. But is it always a supe- 
rior value? Are the archives reliable? Could we uncritically trust reports 
written by agents of Stasi? Is their testimony sufficient to condemn other 
people?” (quoted in Bachmann 2000). In 2000, Michnik demanded the right 
of the public to know who had manipulated and falsified documents in the 
case of Lech Walesa, who was accused of being a former security service 
collaborator (Michnik 2000). 
The lustration process seems to end many doubts that material about 
politicians might be manipulated or falsified. Both lustration laws provide 
citizens with an opportunity to clean their names in the courtroom. It is 
the judge who, based on the law of evidence, evaluates the reliability of 
secret materials and given testimonie~.~~ The value of truth is obviously mu- 
tually conditioned by other values, such as the right to privacy. However, 
it is judicially recognized that those who run or hold high offices should 
expect a higher interest in their personality than other citizens (Lingens v. 
Austria 1986). 
With regard to truth revelation, the two laws differ substantially. This 
requirement is formally satisfied by the Polish lustration act. A person hold- 
ing a public office is obliged to submit an affidavit about her past work, 
service, or collaboration with the security organs. This affidavit is officially 
published in its relevant parts. According to the Spokesperson of Public 
Interest (RIP), the obligation concerns about 25,000 public officials. By the 
end of 2001, 6,689 affidavits had been analyzed; among them, 85 led to 
the initiation of the lustration process. This means that the RIP has found 
sufficient evidence that 85 people submitted untrue affidavits, which led to 
judicial examination by the lustration court. By 2001, the lustration court 
of appeals decided that 18 people had submitted untrue affidavits, among 
them, 4 were members of Parliament, 2 were high State officials, and 
12 were advocates. Positive affidavits that revealed collaboration with 
former security services were submitted by 315 people (Wyciug z i n f m j i  
o dzialalnosci Rzecmiku 2002). 
However, the Polish Monitor publishes only the essence of the affida- 
vits, making the already confined perpetrator-centered truth revelation even 
narrower. The public can learn whether a state official collaborated with 
the security organs but not the nature of the collaboration, its motives, or 
whether it harmed anybody. People are asked to give a second chance to 
collaborators in exchange for a very limited and partial truth. Consequently, 
contrary to the expectations, Poles are deprived of an opportunity to utilize 
the potential of lustration to come to terms with their past. 
There is no such potential in the Czech lustration act, which protects 
a lustrated person from revealing any data concerning her collaboration with 
83. Although the Czech lustration process is primarily administrative, those who receive 
a positive lustration certificate may challenge its truthfulness at the court. See supra note 47. 
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the secret police. The entire lustration process is kept secret; the lustration 
certificate is delivered to the person concerned and cannot be published 
without her consent. Thus, a positively lustrated person has to leave her 
position without any public knowledge of her collaboration. The dilemma 
of the truth versus the protection of the personality of former informers has 
been solved for the benefit of the latter. 
The reason for this difference originates from the beginning of the lus- 
tration process. The Czechoslovak government, which prepared the lustra- 
tion bill, took a radical stand in protecting those who collaborated with the 
previous regime, at the expense of truth. I t  proposed a provision to the bill 
that prohibits the publication of the names of collaborators. Offenders may 
have faced up to three years of imprisonment. Several deputies responded 
critically to the pro~ision.’~ The provision has not been approved, but the 
spirit of incriminating any public revelation of collaborators persists. It con- 
cerns mainly journalists who are charged with illegal manipulation of per- 
sonal data.85 
Despite its truth-centered approach, the superiority of people’s privacy 
is also acknowledged in the application of the Polish lustration act. The 
Spokesperson first verifies positive affidavits. Among the 3 15 positive affi- 
davits submitted by the end of 2001, 165 were found to be unwarranted. 
Thus, only 150 of them were published in the Polish Monitor (Wyciag 7 
informacji o d&lalnosci Rsecmiku 2002). Besides, the hearing at the lustration 
court might be closed to the public if a lustrated person requires so. It is 
quite unusual, however, since the power to decide the closure of the court- 
room usually resides with the judge. Still, the processes may remain closed 
to the public in both countries. 
Access to the secret archives also remains limited in both countries. 
Although in the Czech Republic, the Act on the Access to Files Created 
by Activity of the Former State Security (Act no. 140/1996 Sb.) allows 
everyone to gain access to her file, the names of the informers are black- 
ened.s6 Currently, a Senate legislation initiative is pending that demands 
unlimited access of the public to the archives (CTK 2OOld).8’ According 
84. For example, Deputy Benda (1991a, 1991b) pointed out that if he named a person 
who oppressed him and his family for ten years, he himself, instead of the secret agent, would 
go to jail for three years. If, however, Benda’s information were untrue, he would be charged 
by a different act and go to jail for up to one year. 
85. “According to the investigator, [a reporter of the magazine Tyden, Rebeka Krizunoua] 
committed the crime by publishing in her article ‘Lies of a High State Official’ a copy of a 
protocol from the registry of files of former State Security (StB), which listed the former 
chairperson of the National Property Fund (FNM), Jan Stiess, as a collaborator of the secret 
police” (CTK 2000a). 
86. This might be sufficient to identify the informer from the context of the file, if she 
is otherwise known. For example, the former East German opposition activist Vera: Wallen- 
berger learned that the agent with the cover name “Donald,” whose real name was blacked 
out  and who had been informing on her and caused her imprisonment, was her husband 
Knud (CNN 2002). 
87. The bill has been approved in 2002 as Act 107/2002 Sb. 
Lustration Laws in Action 425 
to a poll conducted by TNS Factum in 2001, 52% Czechs supported the 
bill, while about one-fifth of them were against it (CTK 2001e). About 55% 
of Poles thought that they should have access to their files, and 22% believed 
that access should be provided only for those publicly accused, according 
to the CBOS poll conducted in January 1999 (Karpinski 1999). 
The requirement to know the information about political candidates 
is only incorporated into the Polish lustration act, although the affidavit of 
a parliamentary candidate regarding her past relationships with the former 
repressive apparatus is publicized after her eventual election>* The Czech 
lustration act does not enable the public to know officially whether a candi- 
date or a member of Parliament worked or collaborated with the repressive 
apparatus. Nevertheless, based on 8 21 (2) of the act, political parties may 
require lustration of their candidates. Some parties use the provision regu- 
larly while others do not require lustration. Thus, the act does not preclude 
voters from being represented by secret policemen, their collaborators, or 
former totalitarian  official^.'^ 
E. Retaliation 
There is no evidence to support the allegation that the lustration laws 
institutionalize retaliation. They are not based on the logic of criminal law, 
which implies certain punishment for all of its trespassers. If the legislators 
sought to institutionalize retaliation, they would have enacted sanctions 
against all members of the repressive apparatus. According to Vojtech Cepl, 
Justice of the Czech Constitutional Court, “if revenge had been our motiva- 
tion, there are more effective ways of going about it that inflict a far greater 
sanction than symbolic acts of condemnation, lustration, and restitution” 
(Cepl 1997). 
The Czech lustration law does not sanction every member of the past 
repressive apparatus. Instead, it is primarily forward looking since it concerns 
only access to senior public posts in state institutions (see part 2F, above; 
cf. Teitel 2000, 150). Thus, the law and those that followed its model can 
be called “semi-retributive.” They are not retributive because they do not 
sanction membership in the repressive apparatus, unless these members seek 
to hold senior public posts in the new democracy. This feature distinguishes 
them from the retributive postwar legislation in Europe?’ 
88. The lustration process of presidential candidates is launched before elections. 
89. Several current members of the Czech Parliament were allegedly secret police em- 
ployees or collaborators (e.g., Deputy V. Filip, Deputy V. Exner), according to the exhibition 
of Pode Bal group (2000), named Malik urui: Galerie etablovane mnklatury  (Little as Holes: 
The Gallery of the Established Nomenklatura). The title of the exhibition allows another 
interpretation: Mali kurvi (Little Assholes). 
90. For a comparative overview of purge legislation, see Novick 1968, 209-14; Kritz 2: 
1-201, 3:291-436. The need for special legislation was the common feature of justice after 
the war (Novick 1968,209) as well as after communism. However, these measures differ from 
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There is no evidence of retribution in the Polish lustration law either 
(cf. art. 18b). The law does not impose sanctions on members of the past 
repressive apparatus. It, however, does sanction dishonesty about member- 
ship. It can be called “semi-reconciliatory,” then, because it resembles the 
South African truth and reconciliation process. In Poland, access of collabo- 
rators to leading public offices is exchanged for truth, as amnesty for perpe- 
trators has been exchanged for truth in South Africa. Poland’s law is not 
reconciliatory because it does not provide a wider forum for the country to 
come to terms with its past (David 2002b). 
At the same time, the lack of a viable sanction that prevents former 
security cadres from leading the country can cause popular doubts about the 
Polish Lustration Act. To what extent will people trust institutions occupied 
by those who have revealed their collaboration? This law may paradoxically 
produce certain countereffects by increasing the level of dissatisfaction in 
society. However, empirical evidence shows that it does not have these con- 
sequences. According to a poll conducted in 2000,52% of Poles considered 
lustration of presidential candidates necessary; 72% of them said it was nec- 
essary to know the past of candidates, and 10% stated that lustration proves 
the trustworthiness of a candidate (Autorzy Rzeczpospolitej 2000). One in- 
terpretation of these results may suggest that supporters of lustrations are 
interested in the disclosure of truth generally rather than in the outcome 
of the lustration process-that is, whether a candidate collaborated with 
the former security services. These results rehabilitate the image of lustration 
supporters who may trust a person who worked for the secret service once he 
or she has revealed this fact, and they therefore can no longer be portrayed as 
a vengeful mass, hungry for popular justice. The findings show that the ma- 
jority of lustration supporters might be willing to give their discredited lead- 
ers a second chance as assumed by the law. 
IV. EXCESSIVE PROVISIONS 
Although it seems that lustration laws are quite narrowly drawn, some 
of their provisions may still be too excessive. In order to determine whether 
the substantive provisions of both laws follow at least one of the lustration 
aims, the substantive provisions should be tested against these aims. 
The Polish lustration act concerns the highest constitutional officials, 
one another in their scopes and purposes. The postwar laws were largely retroactive. They 
imposed harsh punishments, ranging from the death penalty to civic disqualification for all 
collaborators, including not only members of Nazi or Fascist groups but also their sympathizers 
(1968, 209-11). The lustration laws, in contrast, only limit the access of secret policemen 
and the top echelons of the Communist Party (the CP leaders are not included in the Polish 
lustration law) to high public posts, a right that is not included in the U.S. Bill of Rights 
and that was deliberately omitted from the European Convention (Ghenapp w .  Germany 
1986, ¶ 48). 
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leading public officials, members of the justice system, and the management 
and supervisory boards of the public media. Inclusion of these positions is 
needed to establish trust in the impartiality of state organs and organizations, 
and they have decisive impact on the protection of national security. The 
Polish lustration law, which is narrower than the Czech one, satisfies this 
test. The Czech lustration act specifies comparable positions in the state 
administration, the judiciary, the public media, and the management of state 
companies, which can be similarly justified by the requirements of trust, 
impartiality, and national security. High-rank positions in the army, the 
police, the information service, the castle police, and some security-sensitive 
concession-based trades are justifiable by security reasons. 
The Czech lustration law also covers leading academic posts such as 
the rectors of universities and the heads of departments. The reason for their 
inclusion might be the reform of tertiary education, largely contaminated 
by ideologists of Marxist-Leninist pr~paganda.~~ These positions can tempo- 
rarily be covered by the aim of discontinuity with the past, which includes 
the need for wider societal reforms. However, there is no pressing reason 
that can justify the incorporation of this category after the reform is accom- 
plished. Ten years of the lustration process offers a chance for reexamination 
of this provision (00 1[31 and 1111Idl). 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the potential of two lustration laws for neutralizing 
the influence of old power networks in the process of transition from authori- 
tarian rules in the Czech Republic and Poland. Based on an analysis of par- 
liamentary debates, it identifies several lustration goals, which are used as 
a normative framework for evaluating the lustration policies. The capacity 
of the laws to achieve the aims, and the extent to which the laws satisfied 
the aims are summarized in table 3. Table 4 then lists some factors that have 
influenced the performance of the laws. 
The comparison of the unregulated lustration stage (Czechoslovakia 
1989-91, Poland 1989-98, and Slovakia since 1993) with the situation 
when the law was in force (Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic since 1991/ 
1993, and Poland since 1999) indicates that lustration laws may contribute 
to the consolidation of emerging democracy. Activities of former political 
and security networks during the absence of the law were associated with 
illegal activities, such as blackmail, subversive and criminal activities, mu- 
tual accusations, political scandals, and the abuse of power. The situation 
in Slovakia has shown that if the law is only enacted for a short period of 
time, or improperly enforced, it cannot adequately prevent subversion. After 
~ ~~ ~ - 
91. This was the main reason for the approval of the Bulgarian “Panev Law” (1992). 
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TABLE 3 
Evaluation of Czech and Polish Lustration Policies 
Czech Lustration Policy Polish Lustration Policy 
(1991-2001) (1999-2OO1) 
Abstract Abstract 
Aim Review* Real Impact Review* Real Impact 
Personnel 
discontinuity 
with the past 
End of the unreg- 
ulated stage 
National security 
and public 
safety 
Disclosure of 
the truth 
about the past 
Retaliation 
Achieved in a 
narrow 
scope.** 
Achieved 
Achieved in a 
narrow 
scope.** 
Unachieved 
Avoided; semi- 
retributive 
character. 
Approximately 
12,000 posi- 
tive lustration 
certificates is- 
sued.*** Posi- 
tively lustrated 
persons some- 
times not dis- 
missed. 
Number of scan- 
dals decreased; 
occasional 
leaking of infor- 
mation about 
collaborators. 
No serious abuses 
of power or 
human rights’ 
violations re- 
ported. 
Granted by other 
laws. 
No incidents of 
street justice 
reported. 
Achieved on a 
very limited 
scale.$ 
Achieved 
Achieved in a 
narrow 
scope.** 
Achieved in a 
narrow 
scope.** 
Avoided; semi- 
reconcilia- 
tory charac- 
ter. 
18 false affidavits 
found within 
three initial 
years. People 
who revealed 
their collabora- 
tion sometimes 
removed. 
Positive results of 
the lustration 
process over- 
shadowed by 
its denuncia- 
tion. 
No serious abuses 
of power or hu- 
man rights vio- 
lation reported. 
Former security 
services mem- 
bers still em- 
ployed in the 
state apparatus. 
6,689 lustration 
affidavits of 
25,000 public 
officials veri- 
fied by the end 
of 2001; the es- 
sence of 150 
positive affi- 
davits pub- 
lished.$$ 
Public might be 
willing to give 
a second 
chance. 
NOTES: *These columns summarize the capacity of the laws to achieve the aims. **The law 
mainly affects leading positions in the public administration and armed services. ***See part 3A 
and note 63. $The law divides high public officials into three groups: those who did not work or 
collaborate with the past security organs, those who did so but revealed the fact, and those who fail 
to confess their past. Only the third group can be removed. $$Wrciag z informacii o d$&dnosci 
Rzecmika 2002. 
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TABLE 4 
Factors Influencing Lustration Policies 
Pattern of 
Factors Influence Czech Lustrations Polish Lustrations 
Main features of 
the laws 
Relationship 
among aims 
(also see part 
1F) 
Scope of the laws 
Timing of the 
launch of the 
process 
Role of media 
Role of leaders 
Role of political 
parties 
A means of discon- 
tinuity. 
The realization of 
one aim may pre- 
clude the ful- 
fillment of other 
aims. 
The scope affects 
the realization of 
aims. 
The delay of the 
process changes 
the intensity 
and nature of 
the problems 
and the chance 
of their solu- 
tions. 
Acts as watchdog 
of the process. 
Leaders exert both 
informal influ- 
ence and formal 
influence, via ex- 
ercise of presi- 
dential powers. 
Lustration is gener- 
ally supported by 
center-right par- 
ties. 
Actual personnel 
discontinuity 
E.g., positively lus- 
trated person 
loses her office 
but keeps her 
“integrity” be- 
cause the pro- 
cess is secret. 
It concerns only 
leading posts. 
Approved in 1991. 
Criticizes the poor 
law enforce- 
ment; engages in 
unauthorized 
publication of 
materials. 
Ambiguous atti- 
tudes of Presi- 
dent Havel. 
Parliament domi- 
nated by center- 
right parties. 
Potential value dis- 
continuity 
E.g., a person who 
reveals her col- 
laboration is ex- 
posed to public 
scrutiny but 
keeps her office. 
It concerns only 
leading posts. It 
does not con- 
cern CP officials 
and new security 
organs. 
Approved in 1997; 
launched in 
1999. 
Presents a biased 
criticism of the 
process (see part 
3B). 
Ambiguous atti- 
tudes of Presi- 
dents Walesa 
and Kwasniew- 
ski. 
After its 2001 elec- 
toral victory, the 
coalition led by 
the largely ex- 
communist SLD 
circumscribed 
the law in 2002. 
NOTE: The performance of the laws may be affected by several other factors besides those listed 
here, such as law enforcement, which is quite poor in transitional countries (see, e.g., informal 
authorization, part 3A; incorrect analysis of data, part 3C; and licensing of weapons trade, part 3C), 
and allocation of resources that may affect the speed of the process, especially in Poland. 
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Slovakia dropped its lustration policy, former secret police members working 
in and leading its information service perpetrated several serious political 
and criminal incidents in its territory as well as in neighboring countries. 
This was perhaps one reason why Slovakia, unlike other countries in the 
region, could not join NATO in 1999 and was temporarily suspended from 
the first wave of the EU enlargement. The example of the long absence of 
any form of lustration in Poland may lead to a post-communist mafia capital- 
ism, which provides international organized crime with new opportunities 
for money laundering, tax evasion, easy access to cheap military equipment, 
and so on (see Los and Zybertowicz 2000,209). This suggests the importance 
of lustrations for the transition to democracy and market economy in gen- 
eral, and the reform of the state administration and security in particular. 
One may argue that many of these problems are caused by political 
circumstances and/or may naturally vanish as time passes. “What would 
have happened in the Czech Republic if lustration hadn’t passed? Perhaps 
we would be in the same position, merely as a result of the passage of 
time. . . . [Allthough it may well be untrue[,] one can imagine that the 
blackmailers used up all the easily blackmailable targets in the first few years, 
and that the problem would have fizzled-out of its own accord even in the 
absence of any legal reform.”92 
The answer to this counterfactual question can be found in the compar- 
ative sections of the paper. The activities of former political and security 
networks continued to exist in 1990-91, two years within which Czechoslo- 
vakia established a liberal democracy; between 1993 and 2001, the Czech 
Republic was a liberal democracy, and the activities of former political and 
security networks were scarcely reported. The problem was also found in 
Poland in 1991-99, a period when it had a liberal government; and Slovakia 
had a semi-liberal democracy when the criminal activities were reported on 
a large scale in 1994-98. We can conclude that the problem does not de- 
pend on the form of government, since in both semi-liberal and liberal de- 
mocracies the criminal activities were reported. Yet, they may intensify in 
a semi-liberal regime. The problems also do not depend on time. They did 
not vanish within two years of transition in Czechoslovakia and within ten 
years of transition in Poland. The question of whether they would vanish 
afterwardslor in other countries is beyond the scope of the paper.93 
92. One reviewer’s comment on the paper. 
93. Hungary, which enacted a fairly gentle version of the lustration law, experienced a 
political scandal with collaborators at the government level 13 years after the breakdown of 
communism (Ecmmist 2002). In postwar France, “Historical quarrels have been politically 
important [. . . 1, but only when they have been the vehicle for contemporary struggles” 
(Novick 1968, 190). 
One may argue that there is a natural time factor-e.g., let’s wait until these people 
die/retire. This, however, reflects a static way of thinking that ignores the fact that these 
networks may change their nature, expand, or become a core for other types of organized 
crime or illegal activities. 
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The lustration law is certainly not sufficient nor an all-mighty law for 
neutralization of old power networks and for democratic consolidation. 
However, it may contribute to the pursuit of these aims, especially after the 
mere structural changes proved to be rather inefficient (Los and Zybertowicz 
2000,219). Many problems cannot be solved by legal means alone, as crime 
cannot be entirely uprooted by criminal law. There should also be other 
laws that would remedy the identified mischief, such as conflict-of-interest 
laws, a freedom of information act, an act on classified materials, a law on 
the financing of political parties, and the regulation of private security com- 
panies, capital markets, privatization, weapons trade, and so on. More impor- 
tant, the public should at least be aware of the past of those who legislate, 
enforce, and apply these laws. 
The comparison of the Czech and Polish lustration policies suggests 
the relative success of the former within a few years following its approval. 
This success may be a result of several factors. The Czech policy might be 
more efficient in removing the old networks from their posts in comparison 
to the Polish policy, which only facilitated discontinuity with the past con- 
ditionally. Moreover, unlike the Polish lustration policy, which concerns 
only secret policemen and their informers, the Czech policy removed also 
the old communist nomenklatura. Finally, it may have been too late for Po- 
land to start this process, which took place a full 10 years after the break- 
down of communism. 
Later, however, the significance of the Czech lustration law decreased 
as nomenklatura cadres adapted to its existence and created new networks 
that enabled them to profit from the privatization process and weapons 
trade. Nevertheless, the circumvention of the lustration law indicates a good 
direction. The international community should consider the promotion of 
fair lustration (without excessive provisions and with proper enforcement) 
in the same way it requires and encourages free elections. 
With respect to recommending a lustration model, the Polish lustration 
act, regulated by criminal justice procedures, is certainly more developed, 
and its concept of a second chance may be politically more acceptable in 
divided countries than the Czech one. The Polish semi-reconciliatory model 
has the potential to facilitate value discontinuity with the past and can be 
applied along with a truth commission, which allows the narrow perpetrator- 
centered character of the lustration truth to be widened. It can also contrib- 
ute to the unification of a divided country. The model, however, requires 
the country to have human and material resources to carry it out. On the 
other hand, the Czech semi-retributive lustration model, which is regulated 
by administrative procedures, although eventually subjected to judicial re- 
view, is more efficient in fulfilling its expectations and less demanding as 
to its realization-for instance, in countries where a new elite wins the 
power but inherits an administration that is loyal to the previous undemo- 
cratic regime. 
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